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Introduction  
Competition Policy is a one of the few domains where theoretical developments are 
constantly enjoying application in practice. A great variety of topics that it offers and the 
possibility of an immediate application of the results in practice keep attracting the attention 
of researchers from around the world. Present thesis contributes to the existing knowledge on 
some of the Competition Policy issues - it covers two of its’ branches: assessment of cartel 
damages and merger evaluations. 
The detection and sanction of cartels traditionally remains of a high importance for 
developed anti-trust authorities because of a clear understanding of their potential harm, and 
therefore of the potential benefits of their deterrence.  In the majority of jurisdiction collusive 
practices that aim at fixing either prices or market shares are considered as damaging per se as 
firms get an opportunity to block the entry of new rivals or to overcharge for their products or 
services without adapting the quality. Nevertheless, developing countries still often struggle to 
create or reinforce their competition authority - running an antitrust division is costly and the 
supportive evidence concerning the potential benefits is still missing. Research on the cartels’ 
damages for developing countries appears not to be not only limited, but also mainly of a 
qualitative nature. To provide the missing quantitative evidence, Chapter 1 offers an 
assessment of the aggregate economic harm caused by cartels in d veloping countries. This 
harm is measured in terms of sales affected by collusive practices as well as in terms of cartel 
excess profits arising from overcharging consumers, both related to GDP. For this purpose, a 
substantive dataset containing the information on more than 200 major ‘hard-core’ cartels 
prosecuted in more than 20 developing countries was collected. In addition, an riginal and 
relatively simple methodology was developed to estimate the pricovercharges when they 
were missing. Our analysis confirms that cartels` impact cn indeed be substantial. For 
example, in terms of sales affected by collusive practices th  maximal rate reaches up to 
6.38%. The estimated damage in terms of cartels’ excess profits divided by GDP can be also 
significant, with the maximal rate reaching almost 1%. Furthermore, as the maximal annual 
probability of uncovering an already existing cartel is estima ed to be around 24%, it is 
suggested that the actual economic harm caused by ‘hard-core’ cartels in developing countries 
exceeds our estimations at least fourfold. 
These results can serve to advocate the introduction or reinforcement of the antitrust 
control in developing countries. More than that, competition authorities may wish to take 
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advantage of the proposed methodology for their own cartel investigations as it will reduce 
the data required to estimate the economic damages. The last, but not the least, the created 
cartels database may be seen as a reference list containing industries that are potentially 
vulnerable to collusive behavior. Cartel members often enter into collusive agreements in 
multiple, often neighboring, economies. Therefore, evidence from other countries can (and 
should) be employed by the competition authorities in local investigations. 
Merger evaluation, in turn, is aimed at preventing the potential damage from increasing 
market concentration beforehand. Since this procedure is known to be costly for both 
competition authority and the parties involved, countries adopt merger guidelines to improve 
the efficiency and facilitate the merger control process. Among the proposed instruments that 
gauge the firms’ incentives to unilaterally increase their pr ces post-merger, the most 
advanced guidelines offer the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and a more 
recent Upward Price Pressure (UPP) test. Chapter 2 offers a comprehensive assessment of 
the accuracy of these tools and, most importantly, defines economic c nditions that favor 
misleading predictions. Monte-Carlo simulations are used to create economies that are further 
employed as workbenches to measure the effects of mergers and to evaluate the performance 
of the chosen evaluation instruments. Results suggest that the HHI test, being originally 
developed for homogenous good markets, when applied to a market with differentiated 
products has a very weak performance in identifying the potential for the price increase by 
merging parties. In its’ turn, the UPP test can also be quit misleading, even if one has perfect 
information on the main ingredients needed to compute it.  The UPP value represents an 
approximation of the alternative costs that the merged firms would face if they would leave 
their prices on the pre-merger level. Therefore, whenever the UPP is positive, firm is said to 
experience a positive pricing pressure, i.e. it has incentives to increase its’ price. It appears 
that type-I and type-II errors may occur because the UPP significantly underestimates or 
overestimates the respective alternative costs. Second reason is that the UPP-like tests by 
construction ignore the pricing pressure experienced by the merging partner. The present 
paper demonstrates how this can be fixed by taking into account the corresponding cross pass-
through rate that represents the firm’s price reaction on the cost shock of the other firm. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that the ignorance of the cross pass-through effect, and 
particularly of its sign, can lead to misleading conclusions as well in other stages of merger 
investigations, including the market definition procedure and the assessment of coordinated 
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effects. Studies that attempted to derive the main drivers of the cross pass-through sign and 
magnitude were often tailored to particular industrial settings and have, therfore, only limited 
relevance for the horizontal merger analysis. Chapter 3 of the present thesis offers an 
examination of the properties of the pass-through matrix in a moreconvenient and at the same 
time sufficiently general framework. It particularly focuses on the cross pass-through rate and 
defines conditions affecting its sign and magnitude. It demonstrates, among other things, that 
the cross pass-through rate cannot dominate the own pass-through one and its relative 
significance decreases with higher number of firms. Nevertheless, as illustrated by some 
examples, this does not mean that the cross pass-through effect can be neglected in merger 
evaluations, especially when it is negative. Second, it provides derivation of the exact 
characteristics of both the demand and supply systems that affect the sign of the cross pass-
through. Therefore it is suggested that the usually adopted in merger simulation assumption of 
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The detection and sanction of cartels traditionally remains of a high importance for 
developed anti-trust authorities because of a clear understanding of their potential harm, and 
therefore of the potential benefits of their deterrence.  In the majority of jurisdiction collusive 
practices that aim at fixing either prices or market shares are considered as damaging per se as 
firms get an opportunity to block the entry of new rivals or to overcharge for their products or 
services without adapting the quality. For example, on a sample of international cartels 
operating in primary product markets Connor (2011a) demonstrated that in last twenty years 
cartels’ prices were at least 25% higher than their competitive benchmark. 
As implementation of the antitrust enforcement requires substantial investments, it can 
be questioned to which extent those expenditures are compensated in terms of prevented 
consumers’ damages. Especially this is relevant for developing competition authorities that 
often experience tough budget constraints. Nevertheless, they often struggle to find the 
supportive evidence that could advocate their efforts - the research th t focuses on the effects 
of cartels in developing economies appears to be very scarce and has mainly taken a 
qualitative approach. Among the few relevant studies, e.g. those of Jenny (2006), Connor 
(2011a) and Levenstein, Suslow and Oswald (2003), only the latter offers a relatively 
comprehensive quantitative assessment of the aggregate impact of crtels’ agreements. Based 
on the international trade flows data and a list of forty-two detect d international cartels 
prosecuted in the U.S. and the EU in 1990s and operating on developing markets, uthors 
estimated that imports affected by cartel agreements constitute 3.4-8.4%  of total imports in 
developing economies, or  0.6-1.7% when divided by the corresponding GDPs. Due to hidden 
and sometimes tacit nature of cartels and various methodological problems that did not allow 
authors to take all the observations into account, it is suggested that the actual impact could be 
much more significant.  
Taking into account both international and local cartels and having measured the 
aggregated cartel excess profits resulting from price overcharges could provide a clearer  
picture of the actual damage suffered by consumers in developing countries. These 
estimations can in turn be employed to advocate the introduction or reinforcement of the 
antitrust control in the concerned economies. Present study aims at providing the required 
evidence. 
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The paper will stick to the following outline. Section 2 comprises a description of the 
data mining process and a discussion over the descriptive statistics of he collected sample of 
cartels. We also present our original methodology that was developed t  r cover the missing 
price overcharges. While being quite simple and intuitive, its’ main advantage is that it 
requires a very limited data to be implemented. In Appendix C we illustrate the application of 
this methodology on one of the cases from our database. Overall, collected data do not bring 
any strong evidence to the widespread idea that cartel overcharges in developing countries are 
more significant than those in developed countries. We show, however, that the 
anticompetitive impact in terms of price overcharges is at least of a similar scale, which calls 
for adequate antitrust measures. We believe that stronger results are achieved by looking at 
the aggregate measures of cartelization harm that we present in Section 3. We focus on 
several aggregate indicators. To estimate the cartels’ impact on the country level, as in 
Levenstein, Suslow and Oswald (2003) we find it appropriate to consider aggregated sales 
affected by collusive practices and, more innovatively, aggregated cartels’ excess profits that 
result from price overcharges. Both measures related to GDP. We find that in terms of 
affected sales related to the GDP the maximal rate reaches up to 6.38%. The actual harm to 
consumers in terms of cartels’ excess profits can be also significant, with the maximal rate 
reaching almost 1% of the GDP. We supplement the discussion with a simplified cost-benefit-
like analysis of the antitrust enforcement by relating aggregated cartels’ excess profits to the 
budget of the corresponding competition authority. Our results demonstrate that in majority of 
considered countries price overcharges significantly exceed budget expenses aimed at 
preventing them. Overall, obtained estimates reflect the very minimal bound for the economic 
harm caused by collusive behaviour because data on detected cartels in d veloping countries 
are very limited, but mostly because some of them remain uncovered. To assess how far (or 
how close) our aggregated estimates are from the reality, in Section 4 we adopt the 
methodology proposed in Combe et al (2008) to estimate the deterrence rate, i.e., the annual 
probability of a cartel to be uncovered. We find that at least three out of four existing cartels 
remain undetected. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to apply this methodology on a 
sample of cartels detected in developing countries. S ction 5 concludes the paper. 
Competition authorities in developing countries could have a practical interest in the 
respective results for the advocacy of their efforts. Furthermore, they may wish to take 
advantage of the proposed methodology for their own cartel investigations as it will reduce 
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the data required to estimate the damages caused by cartelization, in terms of, for instance, 
price overcharges and output losses. 
2. Collected data: cartels’ profile in developing countries 
Data collection process 
Our analysis is based on the original dataset containing informati n on 249 major ‘hard-
core’ cartels that were prosecuted in more than 20 developing countries from 1995 to 2013.1 
In Appendix A we provide a reduced version of this dataset that contains the li t of countries, 
identified cartel cases and their respective periods of existence. We restrict our attention to the 
chosen period because many of developing countries have established their competition 
authorities just recently, if at all; hence no or very poor data could be collected for earlier 
years. Nevertheless, we find it sufficiently long to obtain a representative smple. 
The list of countries chosen to participate in the study was created according to the 
active state of their competition authorities and sufficiency of their experience. For this reason 
many of the developing economies were excluded from consideration. Nevertheless, they 
could still profit of the current study results to advocate the introduction of the competition 
law or its enforcement. 
Given the complexity of possible reasons for collusive behavior and consequet welfare 
effects, we only focus on so-called 'hard core' cartels, i.e. when cartel participants aim at 
increasing their profits by the means of collective price or market share fixing. These 
agreements between firms are assumed to be harmful for consumers per se and, therefore, are 
illegal in the majority of antitrust jurisdictions.  Hence, we do not include in the database 
buyers’ cartels, collective predatory pricing cases or collusive agreements that were given an 
exemption by competition authorities.2 
For every defined ‘hard core’ cartel, we aimed at collecting quite substantial descriptive 
data, including relevant market(s), number of colluding firms, cartel duration, cartel’s sales, 
applied penalties and estimated price overcharges. Given the absolute lack of data on losses in 
                                                          
1The chosen countries are considered as developing economies according to the International Monetary Fund's 
World Economic Outlook Report, April 2010. 
2Collusive behavior could be given an exemption by competition authority if it is proven to be beneficial for 
consumers or necessary in given economic conditions. Thi  was, for instance, the case of the cartel in the mixed 
concrete industry in South Korea in 2009. 
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output or welfare, we have chosen price overcharges as a measure of the economic damage. 
When a cartel operated on several relevant markets we considered thos  episodes separately, 
if available data allowed doing so. When no exact date or month but only year of cartel’s 
creation or breakdown was known, we assumed that cartel’s duration comprises the complete 
year from January to December, similar for months. Cartel’s sales were calculated as revenues 
of all colluding firms during the considered period on the relevant market only. Data on 
penalties include all applied fines (both for companies and executives) as well as finalized 
settlements.  In some cases inputs were provided in different curren ies. Therefore, when 
needed, cartel’s sales were converted by using average exchange rates corresponding to the 
period of cartel’s existence, while for penalties we used the exchange rate that corresponded 
to the period when the final decision on the case was made. To be able to perform the cost-
benefit analysis we also looked for budgets of competition authorities. 
The data were obtained from numerous sources such as competition authorities’ 
websites, companies’ annual reports, reports of international organizatio s such as OECD, 
UNCTAD, etc. A significant piece of information came from the existing database on 
international cartels.3 However, our sample would not be so rich without cooperation with 
local competition authorities.4 For this purpose, they were asked to fill out a special 
questionnaire. (See Appendix B.) In addition to the mentioned above target data this 
questionnaire requests for some additional inputs required for our original methodology that 
we developed to estimate the price overcharges. The minimal data that re necessary to for 
this purpose are quite limited and include only prices, market shares and ales of colluding 
companies at least for one period of cartel existence. All the other cartel-specific information 
requested in the questionnaire is not mandatory to implement the methodology, but helps to 
better calibrate market parameters and, eventually, improve the estimation results. We explain 
the methodology in more detail and report obtained estimates later in the section.  
Our database makes a substantial contribution in summarizing and, most imp rtantly, 
enriching the existing knowledge on price overcharges caused by cartels. It comprises not 
only international cartels (as, for instance in Levenstein et al. (2003)), but also cartels formed 
by domestic firms only. Cartels’ industrial profile in our sample is similar to the one described 
                                                          
3 Private International Cartels spreadsheet by John M. Connor, Purdue University, Indiana, USA (March 2009). 
4We wish to thank for a fruitful cooperation competition authorities from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Peru, South Africa, Russia, Mexico, Ukraine, Pakistn, Zambia and South Korea and Mauritius, as well as 
UNCTAD RPP initiative coordinators. 
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extensively by Jenny (2006), therefore we do not go deeper in this aspect but instead focus on 
the quantitative assessment.  
Descriptive statistics of the sample 
We provide some descriptive statistics of the collected data in Table 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the collected sample 
Variable #obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Duration, months 185 46 27 50 1 420 
Number of cartel members 200 15 5 37 2 300 
Price overcharge, % 83 23.1 20.0 14.6 2.4 75.0 
Penalties/Excess profits ratio, % 72 51.8 19.0 118.2 0.0 950.5 
Table 1: We measure the price overcharge as % of the cartel pric . Whether minimal and  maximal bounds for 
the price overcharge are both known , we used the average between the two.  
The median number of colluding firms and median cartel’s duration in months are equal 
to 5 and 27 correspondingly.5 Analogous calculations for developed economies (see Connor 
(2011b)) indicate similar results for the number of cartel participants but, surprisingly, a 
higher level of median cartel duration - around 50 months in the North America and 70 in the 
E.U. These results may seem to be in conflict with the popular opinion that in developing 
countries collusion is sustainable for longer periods because of stronger market imperfections 
and a weaker antitrust enforcement. However, this observation can be supported by 
theoretical results that demonstrate that on unstable but growing markets deviation from cartel 
agreement can indeed be very attractive. (See Motta (2004)). 
We do not provide descriptive statistics for the absolute values of cartels’ sales and 
penalties because considered countries, their economies and, eventually, carte s are diversified 
in scale. Instead, we find it important to report descriptive statistics of some relative measures, 
such as penalties-excess profits ratio and price overcharges that we measure with respect to 
the cartel price. We define cartel’s excess profits as the extra margin resulting from sales at 
higher prices, taking cartel unit sales as a basis. 
We observe that the penalties-excess profits ratio for our sample has quite extreme ends 
– it varies from 0% to 950%. The former can be explained by the fact th t not all of the 
detected cartels were subject to the fine. The reason for the la ter is that penalties were 
                                                          
5Median values are more convenient to consider becaus  the data are skewed and contain a few outliers with 
number of cartel participants more than 200 and duration of more than 150 months thatrenders mean values 
uninformative. 
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sometimes calculated as percentage of the total sales of cartel members instead of sales on the 
relevant market only.  Nevertheless, the average for developing countries ratio remains very 
low compared to the U.S. level (19% against 57%) and is just slightly below the E.U. level of 
26% (see Graph 1).  
Graph 1: Comparison of penalty-excess profits ratios, % 
 
Graph 1:In brackets we provide the number of observations used. Country-level data is given only when number 
of observations is more than 2. Data on the E.U. and the U.S. is obtained from Connor (2011b). 
Remarkably, even in developed countries competition authorities on average do not 
recuperate excess profits gained by cartel members. Moreover, if one would appropriately 
discount overcharges and penalties to account for money depreciation, those rates would be 
even lower. According to Hammond (2005) and Connor (2011a) such a situation should be 
characterized as ‘under-punishment’ because optimal deterrence of cartels formation requires 
penalties to be higher than extra profits resulted from collusive arrangements. At the same 
time, Allain et al. (2011) argue that the E.U. penalty rules can be considered as ‘optimal’, 
even if eventual penalty–excess profits ratio is relatively low. They demonstrate that the 
dynamic effects together with an appropriate estimation of price overcharges (i.e. corrected 
for model and estimation error and publication bias) have a significa t impact on the 
determination of the optimal dissuasive penalties, i.e. penalties that wipe out all the expected 
profits resulting from the anticompetitive infringement. The optimality of a penalty rule that 
does not require a 100% recuperation of the excess cartel profits can be also supported by the 
following intuition. On one hand, by imposing fines competition authorities try to deter 
formation of cartels or make it more risky for existing collusion to continue, expecting that a 
more severe penalty rule to result in a stronger deterrence effect. On the other hand, too high 
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initial goal of restitution of the fair competition. If cartel was operating on the market for 
many years, it might be impossible for the firms to pay back all the extra profits that they have 
obtained by overcharging. The fact that competition authorities try to balance these two 
effects in different ways justifies the diversification of thepenalty-excess profits ratios among 
countries.  
The present study does not aim at assessing whether penalty rules in developing 
countries are optimal or not, nor it claims that they should follow the example of developed 
antitrust jurisdictions. What we want to highlight here, is that fac ors that define the optimal 
antitrust policy are quite numerous, starting from the very definition of the optimality that 
every competition authority decides on its own. Therefore, the effective penalty rule indeed 
can (and, most probably, should) be country-specific. 
It could be expected that a weaker antitrust enforcement provides cartels with 
incentives to set higher prices. Our collected sample does not provide any strong support to 
this intuition. As can be seen from Table 2 below, the median price overcharge rate for our 
sample is of the same range as the one experienced by the E.U. countries (20% versus 19.5-
22.48%) and is only slightly higher than 16.7-19% estimated for the U.S. and Canada. 
Table 2: Comparison of cartel price overcharges from existing studies (in %) 
Country/group # obs. Mean Median 
Developing countries (our sample), 1995-20136 : 83 23.1 20.0 
Developing countries (Connor (2010b)), 2000-2009: 33 n/a n/a 
China 2 17.42 17.42 
Egypt 4 20.26 19.61 
India 1 16.67 16.67 
Korea 22 24.01 14.89 
Mexico 1 15.25 15.25 
Pakistan 1 42.53 42.53 
Turkey 2 53.49 53.49 
EU (Connor (2011b), 1990-2010 105 n/a 19.5 
EU (Connor (2010b), 1990-2009 11 28.16 22.48 
US  (Connor (2011b), 1990-2010 97 n/a 19 
US and Canada, (Connor, 2010b), 1990-2009 29 39.61 16.67 
Table 2:  Estimates from Connor (2010b) were originally provided with respect to a ‘but-for’ prices, therefore 
they were recalculated with respect to the cartel pice to be comparable with the other data from the table. 
                                                          
6Our sample contains cases that were prosecuted from 1995 to 2013, but could have existed before. 
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Estimation of price overcharges –methodology and results 
In our study data on price overcharges constitute a departure point towards the 
measure of the aggregated economic harm induced by cartelization. We acknowledge that in 
the context of developing countries estimations of price overcharges ppear to be very scarce. 
One of the reasons is that this kind of estimations might be very demanding in terms of time 
and expertise that represent a serious constraint for a young competition authority. Besides, to 
condemn a cartel they mostly rely on the evidence on coordination activities (such as phone 
calls, meeting notes etc.) rather than the economic one (such as parallel pricing or constant 
market shares, etc.).  To address this issue and to fill some of th missing estimates out, we 
have developed an original methodology that is simple enough to implement while well 
economically grounded. 
The methodology employs the following approach that is applied on a case-by-case 
basis. Based on the collected cartel data one first performs the calibration of the supply and 
demand parameters on the cartelized market. If cartel operates on several markets calibration 
should be performed for each of them separately, if collected data allow doing so. Having the 
estimated parameters at hand, one then proceeds with the simulation of hypothetical 
(counterfactual) competitive equilibrium, i.e. market state absent cartelization. Finally, by 
comparing cartelized and counterfactual (competitive) states, one ca  calculate price 
overcharges and corresponding losses in the output and the consumers’ welfare.  
To perform the calibration of market parameters, we consider a model that describes 
the equilibrium outcomes on the differentiated product market, where firms compete in prices 
(differentiating product characteristics are assumed to be fixed). Demand and supply are 
modeled separately in order to recover equilibrium outcomes.  
Precisely, market demand is derived from a general class of di crete choice models of 
consumer behavior. LOGIT specification that we have chosen is simple and good enough to 
obtain the desirable structure of demand and, most importantly, it allows explicit calculation 
of the consumers’ surplus in money terms. We assume that there are N potential consumers 
on the market, each of them considers buying one unit of the product from one of J firms that 
form a cartel. Consumer can also choose the so called ‘outside option’, denoted with index 
“0”. Outside option may represent a substitute offered by other firms (not participating in the 
cartel) as well as consumer’s decision not to buy at all.  
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The utility of consumer i buying product j  is defined as , where 
 are parameters of differentiation (e.g. quality of the product or services offered) 
that are specific to each product and jp is the price of product j . is the marginal utility of 
money common for all products and consumers  that reflects the sensitivity  of consumers to 
the price relative to how they value quality.  Higher would mean th t consumers take their 
decision mostly according to the price of the product, rather than i s quality characteristic. ijυ
is the consumer i’s idiosyncratic utility component that is specific to product j . It is assumed 
to be identically and independently distributed across consumers and products.  
Consumer i chooses product j if it maximizes her expected utility, such that 
. According to Berry (1994), demand associated with the alternative j can, 
therefore, be represented by the following equation: 
 jjj ppsps αδ −+= ))(ln())(ln( 0       (1) 
where js is a market share of the firm j and 0s is the share of the outside option and 
),....,( 2,1 Jpppp =  is the price vector..  






















     (2) 
where the utility of the outside option is normalized to zero ( NiU i ,1,00 =∀= )  
Note, that since the size of the market is fixed to N, market shares can be easily 
interpreted in terms of sold quantities and vice versa. 
In such framework, profit of each firm j is defined by the function
Npscpp jjjj *)(*)()( −=π , where jc  are marginal costs that are assumed to be constant. 
Further we employ several hypotheses that help to simplify the model and recover 
unknown market parameters. We first presume that cartel participants act under perfect 
collusion, choosing prices that maximize the joint profit of the cartel. Second, we assume that 
cartel members agree to fix their gross margins to a certain value that is constant for all firms, 




jjUU jiij ≠′∀> ′
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such that Jjconstcp jj ,1,)( =∀=− . Under these assumptions, from the cartel’s joint profit 





=∀=− α        (3) 
System of equations that includes (2) and (3), therefore, fully describes the cartelized 
market equilibrium Jjsp cartelj
cartel
j ,1),,( =∀ . Cartel’s prices and market shares one can recover 
from factual market data related to the period of cartelization. Note, however, that market 
shares that are employed in the model ( carteljs ) are not the same as those observed from the 
market data (denoted ascarteljs ). The latter ones stand for the market shares within the cartel, 














js .  
To be able to solve the system of equations composed f (2) and (3), and by doing so 
recover the unknown market parameters, one would nee  to set two of them exogenously. 
One of the parameters that we initially choose to fix is the gross cartel margin
Jjcp j
cartel


















.7  Because the latter is a relative measure and therefor  can be 
much easier to interpret we finally choose the averg  cartel margin as one of the exogenous 
parameters for the calibration procedure. The second parameter is the share of the outside 
option 0s . 
Firms gross margins could be extracted from the colluding companies’ annual reports, 
even if often only approximately.  In contrast, it becomes much more complicated when it 
comes to the estimates of the share of the outside option. There is no standard procedure to 
define the potential market size, and methodology might differ significantly depending on the 
product and market considered. However, independently o  the procedure chosen, the sum of 
                                                          
7Recall that margin constant for all cartel participants is one of the basic assumptions of the methodology. 
Keeping this in mind, when market shares and prices ar  known, it is easy to recover average cartel margin from 
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j .  
Having set exogenously average cartel margin and share of the outside option we first 























      (4) 
In the list of the parameters set exogenously one ca  choose to replace cartel’s margin 
or the share of the outside option with marginal costs if they are known. In this case equation 
(4) will remain valid and further steps of the methodology will not be affected. 
Now we have all required information to recover theparameters of differentiationjδ
from equation (1). Marginal costs can , therefore, b  recovered from the values of margins, 
either average for the cartel or firm-specific gross margins. 
 While choosing values of exogenous parameters, one needs to make sure that obtained 
values of marginal costs and parameter of sensitivity to the priceα are non-negative. Note, 
that there are no sign restrictions to the values of jδ .  




jjj ,1),1( =∀−−= αε       (5) 
jiJijps carteli
cartel
iji ≠=∀= ,,1,,αε       (6) 
Obtained estimates can be compared with existing ones from the other sources. This 
may be seen as an additional cross-validation for the values of exogenous parameters and may 
result in corresponding corrections.  
At the end of the calibration procedure one has all missing market parameters 
),1,,( Jjcand jj =∀δα  recovered. They are assumed to remain the same whether the market 
is cartelized or not. And now we are ready to proceed with the simulation of the 
counterfactual (competitive) state of the market.  
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In the absence of collusion each firm would take a decision on its own price to 
maximize own profits, taking into account own marginal costs and expected pricing strategy 










       (7) 
while (2) remains valid.  
As a solution of the system of equations (7) and (2) we obtain counterfactual 
(competitive) prices  and market shares . By comparing cartel’s and 
competitive prices we can calculate price overcharge for every cartel member as well as 





















sP       (8) 
Formula in (8) gives a price overcharge estimate in percentage, but it can easily be 
transformed into money terms by multiplying firm specific price overcharges on the 
corresponding cartel member sales.  
Moreover, employed demand model allows explicit calcul tion of the consumers’ 
welfare (surplus) losses, both in percentage and in mo ey terms. We make use of the formula, 


















      (9) 
Hence, relative consumers’ welfare losses caused by collusive practices could be 






























































αδαδ   (10) 
On one hand, an obvious advantage of our methodology is that it requires very limited 
data to be implemented: it can be employed only with information on prices and observed 
market shares of colluding companies at least for one period of cartel existence. On the other 
hand, it is based on a relatively simple model and uses a few assumptions that result in certain 
Jjpcj ,1, = Jjs
c
j ,1, =
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limitations. We discuss them below. 
First, demand is designed from a simple LOGIT model, which is quite flexible but has a 
specific property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. In a nutshell, this model 
generates a particular consumers’ behavior pattern: motivated by a price increase consumers 
would switch to the product with the maximal market share, but not the one with closest 
quality characteristics. Indeed, it may not be a true behavioral pattern in reality. 
 Second, our methodology is based on assumption about the perfect collusion among 
cartel participants while real level of coordination among firms could be much weaker. Under 
these conditions, obtained estimates of price overcharge and consumers’ welfare losses are the 
maximal ones for the assumed levels of cartel’s margin and share of the outside option. 
Third, when one changes assumptions about cartel margin nd/or share of the outside 
option, then values of calibrated market parameters and, ultimately, final estimates of the 
interest also change. For this reason it makes sense to consider not the exact values but rather 
a reasonable range for each of exogenous parameters, based on the common sense and 
available market data. Sensitivity of estimation results with respect to the parameters that are 
set exogenously differs in each particular market. Considering reasonable ranges for external 
parameters rather than exact values shall help in assessing the robustness of obtained results. 
Additional market expertise, when available, could a so help to narrow down the range of 
calibrated market parameters and, eventually, obtain more precise estimations of price 
overcharge and consumers’ welfare losses. 
In the Appendix C we illustrate application of the proposed methodology on the price-
fixing cartel between civil airlines in Brazil. 
It is unfortunate to acknowledge that competition authorities in developing countries 
often do not possess even the minimal economic data required to employ the methodology. 
Or, even if they do, it is often considered as confidential. Due to this reason, it was possible to 
perform estimations only in eleven cases. Results are provided in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Estimates of price overcharges and output losses obtained with the use of 
the developed methodology 










Civil airlines (Brazil) Jan’99-Mar’03 3.20% 33.90% 10.00% 24.2% 
Crushed rock (Brazil) Dec’99-Jun’03 3.40% 11.25% 15.69% 25.80% 
Security guard services (Brazil) 1990-2003 4.80% 27.84% 14.93% 23.15% 
Industrial gas (Brazil) 1998-Mar’04 4.12% 29.96% 5.00% 22.77% 
Steel bars (Brazil) 1998-Nov’1999 5.49% 37.84% 10.99% 27.81% 
Steel (Brazil) 1994-Dec’99 13.55% 40.13% 5.00% 29.2% 
Medical gases (Chile) 2001-2004 37.50% 49.40% 2.00% 14.93% 
Petroleum products (Chile) Feb’01-Sep’02 4.57% 9.90% 10.43% 23.35% 
Construction materials (Chile) 20 Oct’06 47.78% 83.4 % 7.24% 22.95% 
Petroleum products II (Chile) Mar’08-Dec’08 1.78% 11. 3% 9.63% 18.99% 
Cement (Egypt) Jan’03-Dec’06 28.20% 39.3% 5.00% 10.00% 
Average  for the category 14.04% 34.01% 8.68% 21.94% 
Average 24.02% 15.41% 
Median 18.6% 16.9% 
Table 3: Price overcharge is measured with respect to the cartelized price, while losses in the output with 
respect to the counterfactual (competitive) state. 
Obtained average and median price overcharge rate of 24.21% and 18.6% 
correspondingly are of the same magnitude as for the est of the sample (23.1% and 20%, see 
Table 1).  We acknowledge, however, that the difference between the estimated maximal and 
minimal bounds of price overcharges and output losses i  often large. A competition authority 
that wants to implement the proposed methodology would certainly obtain a greater precision 
provided it uses the best information on the input arameters. Further analysis in Section 3 
includes these additional estimations. 
3. Aggregated cartels’ effects 
Overall, the descriptive statistics of the collected data demonstrate that the 
anticompetitive impact in terms of price overcharges is at least similar to that in developed 
countries, which calls for adequate antitrust measures. Young competition authorities, that 
                                                          
8Minimal and maximal estimated output losses can appe r  rounded. This is a results of some particularities of 
the methodology employed , particularly because some parameters need  to be set exogenously. 
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often lack resources to efficiently fight against collusive practices are having hard times 
lobbing for a greater budget and, therefore, are constantly looking for strong and motivating 
evidence of the benefits that their existence brings. We believe that the latter could be 
provided by looking at the aggregate measures of cartelization harm that we provide in this 
section. The approach that we use consists in summing up the obtained cartel case-specific 
impact estimates in money terms and assessing their significance on the macro-economic 
level. 
Precisely, in our analysis we focus on several aggregate indicators. First, inspired by 
Levenstein, Suslow and Oswald (2003) we find it appro riate to consider aggregated sales 
that were affected by collusive behavior, i.e. total revenues received by cartel members.  More 
innovatively, we also assess the aggregate cartel damage in terms of excess profits. Both 
measures are summed up for all cartels in each particul  country and related to the GDP. We 
supplement the discussion with a sort of “cost-benefit” analysis of the antitrust enforcement 
by relating the aggregated excess profits to the budget of the corresponding competition 
authority (“CA Budget”).  
In order to obtain more comprehensive aggregated estimates we first fill the remaining 
data gaps in by applying an additional treatment to the originally collected data.  
For those countries where competition authority sets maximal penalty as percentage of 
cartel’s sales (like, for instance, in Brazil, South Korea, Ukraine, South Africa, etc.), we 
approximate the missing cartel sales as the respective penalty in money terms divided by the 
maximal penalty rate.9 Note that this approach provides an estimate of the minimal level of 
cartel’s sales. The penalty in those cases is set based on the sales recorded in the year 
preceding the one where the court decision on the cas  was made. Therefore, the minimal 
approximated cartel sales need to be further multiplied by cartel duration in years. When price 
overcharge was unknown and it was not possible to employ the proposed methodology to 
estimate it, we roughly approximated the excess cartel’s excess profits by multiplying the 
sample median overcharge rate and cartel sales. In case cartel sales were missing, we first 
assumed the cartel’s excess profits as equal to applied enalties. Recall that, according to 
Table 1, applied penalties do not in average compensat  for the excess profits gained by cartel 
                                                          
9 For example, if a cartel was fined for 100 USD and the maximal penalty rate is 10% of cartel’s sales, then 
minimal bound for cartel’s sales can be estimated as 100/0.1=1000 USD. Because percentage penalty rule is 
sometimes applied to company’s total sales, we haveemployed, where needed and where possible, a coefficient 
that corresponds to the share of sales on the relevant market in total company sales.  
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members, therefore this approximation provides a mini al level of cartel’s excess profits. 
Knowing the minimal level of cartel’s excess profits allowed, in turn, recovering back the 
missing cartel sales by applying the median price overcharge rate. 
 Finally, to make the nominal values, such as sales, excess profits, penalties and 
competition authorities’ budgets comparable among different years, we apply relevant 
denominators to translate them into the currency of the last year of the considered period 
(specific for each country). 
Aggregated harm was calculated separately for countries with sufficient data, namely 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, South 
Korea, Ukraine and Zambia. The selection criterion is basically the availability of quantified 
impacts of cartels that represent a significant parof all detected cases in the country. Except 
for Zambia, whose only quantified cartel had a tremendous economic impact. 
For these countries in Table 4 below we provide the breakdown of recorded cartel cases 
indicating the number of quantified ones. Information n brackets refers to number of cases 
for which corresponding missing inputs were approximated by means of the above treatment. 
We employ the term ‘allocated’ for those cartels when we were able to associate sales and 
excess profits with a certain year, i.e. only those when at least cartel’s beginning or 
breakdown year was known. 
Table 4: Availability of quantified impacts of detected cartels (numbers) 
Country (period) 
# of cartels 
recorded 
# of cartels with 
data on sales 
# of cartels with 
data on overcharges 
# of ‘allocated’ 
cartels 
Brazil (1995-2005) 18 17(1) 17(3) 17 
Chile (2001-2009) 17 16(6) 16(7) 16 
Colombia (1997-2012) 18 17(17) 17(17) 17 
Indonesia (2000-2009) 12 8(0) 8(1) 7 
Mexico (2002-2011) 17 17(9) 17 (11) 17 
Pakistan  (2003-2011) 14 14(6) 14(9) 14 
Peru (1995-2009) 11 10(2) 10(2) 10 
Russia (2005-2013) 15 11(10) 11(11) 11 
South Africa  (2000-2009) 37 23(7) 23(18) 23 
South Korea (1998-2006) 26 26(0) 26(8) 26 
Ukraine (2003-2012) 7 7(6) 7(7) 3 
Zambia (2007-2012) 7 1(0) 1(0) 1 
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The two aggregated indicators of the interest we first calculate as an average for the 
considered period. Looking at the year-to-year dynamics would be misleading because both 
ends of the period have a high risk of not being representative - either because of a low 
activity of the competition authority in the beginni g or because the end of the period is often 
characterized by multiple ongoing cartel investigations. Absent final decision made on the 
case corresponding price overcharges and other data cannot be included into the database.  
Because of these reasons even average for the period estimates can be biased, thus we find it 
important to report also the maximal value together with the year that it corresponds to. Table 
5 summarizes obtained results. 
Table 5: Aggregated indicators  
Country 
Aggregated excess profits / 
GDP, % 
Affected sales/ GDP, % Aggregated excess 
profits / CA Budget 
Average Max (year) Average Max (year) Average Max (year) 
Brazil (1995-2005) 0.21% 0.43% (1999) 0.89% 1.86% (1999) 308 1232 (1998) 
Chile (2001-2009) 0.06% 0.23% (2008) 0.92% 2.63% (2008) 23 91 (2008) 
Colombia (1997-2012) 0.001% 0.002%(2011) 0.01% 0.01% (2011) 7 36 (2006) 
Indonesia (2000-2009) 0.04% 0.09% (2006) 0.50% 1.14% (2006) 29 58 (2004) 
Mexico (2002-2011) 0.01% 0.02% (2011) 0.05% 0.11% (2011) 7 19 (2011) 
Pakistan  (2003-2011) 0.22% 0.56% (2009) 1.08% 2.59% (2009) 245 518 (2008) 
Peru (1995-2009) 0.002% 0.007%(2002) 0.01% 0.023% (2002) 6.44 25 (2004) 
Russia (2005-2013) 0.05% 0.12% (2012) 0.24% 0.67% (2012) 0.58 1.45 (2008) 
South Africa  (2000-2009) 0.49% 0.81% (2002) 3.74% 6.38% (2002) 124 214 ( 005) 
South Korea (1998-2006) 0.53% 0.77% (2004) 3.00% 4.38% (2004) 144 214 (2004) 
Ukraine (2003-2012) 0.03% 0.03% (2011) 0.15% 0.16% (2011) 0.84 0.88 (2011) 
Zambia (2007-2012) 0.07% 0.09% (2007) 0.18% 0.24% (2007) 11 27 (2007) 
Average 0.14%  0.9%  76  
 
Our results confirm that cartels` impact in developing economies can indeed be 
substantial. In terms of affected sales related to GDP, it varies among countries from 0.01% to 
3.74% on average for the considered periods, while its maximal value reaches up to 6.38% for 
South Africa in 2002. Remarkably, calculations for Zambia are based on only one cartel for 
which data are available (market of fertilizers, 2007-2012), but even taking this into 
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consideration the impact is not negligible (0.24% of GDP in terms of affected sales). Actual 
harm in terms of aggregated cartels’ excess profits is also significant, with maximal rates 
reaching almost 1% in terms of GDP for South Korea in 2004 and South Africa in 2002.  
The cost-benefit analysis performed for selected competition authorities demonstrates 
that potential benefits of having an antitrust division (or alternative costs of not having it)  
measured as aggregated cartel excess profits  exceed th  competition authorities’ budgets on 
average 76 times and can reach up to 1232 times (se the last two columns in Table 5).10  
Here we assume that a cartel would exist for at least as long as it already did before being 
discovered. Data on budgets that we have collected comprise expenses for all activities of the 
competition enforcement unit, including merger investigations that are traditionally highly 
demanding in terms of resources. Therefore, the cartel-specific efficiency rate can turn out 
significantly higher. 
Our estimates can be considered as a very minimal bound for the economic harm 
caused by collusive behaviour because of multiple reasons. First of all, the collected data on 
detected cartels remain very limited. Even though some competition authorities agreed to 
cooperate, we have to acknowledge that the list of pr secuted ‘hard – core’ cartels for every 
country is still not complete, nor were all the required data obtained for each of the cases. Out 
of 249 defined cases only 83 have data on price overcharges, 175 on applied penalties and 114 
on cartel’s sales. As Table 4 above illustrates, many of recorded cases were excluded from 
calculations of the aggregate effects because of missing data. On top of this there is another 
reason, t hat may in fact be a principal one - some f the existing cartels remain uncovered. 
                                                          
10 Here we assume that when cartel breaks down then firms come back to their competitive equilibrium 
strategies. As a consequence of this, firms are supposed to low down prices to a pre-cartel level. Evidence on 
post-cartel behavior collected by Connor (2010a) and  Sproul (1993) indicates that this assumption might not be 
always valid. Given that for our sample very limited price data were available even for the period of cartel 
existence, and no data at all are available for post-cartel periods, we should admit that this is almost impossible 
to test whether the assumption in question holds for our sample of cartels.  
Note that a high level of excess cartel profits related to the competition authority budget does not necessarily 
witness for the efficiency of the antitrust enforcement. Firstly, a low level of the ratio in question can  result 
from a high efficiency of the competition authority f the latter focuses rather on cartel deterrence (education 
through mass media or higher penalties, etc.) than cartel detection. Low number of detections or lower excess 
profits can simply reflect the fact that there exist fewer cartels or that they are weaker. Second reason is that 
competition authorities can ‘free ride’ on the experience of the other ones. By ‘free riding’ we mean a situation 
when a cartel case already went through an examination in one of the competition authorities, and the others use 
this fact to trigger its own investigation or even use the already extracted evidence. Therefore a competition 
authority can win the case without investing too much. As the collected sample demonstrates, ‘free riding’ can 
indeed take in place - the same cartels are often fou d in a large number of (often neighboring) countries. For 
example, this is the case of industrial gas distribu ion cartels in Latin America or cement cartels in Africa. 
Although, ‘free riding’ can potentially be considered as a sort of efficiency as it is a way of ‘economizing’ the 
resources. 
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To assess how far (or how close) we are from understanding the real scale of the damage, in 
the next section we estimate the deterrence rate, i.e., the annual probability of a cartel to be 
detected. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to do so on a sample of cartels detected in 
developing countries. 
4. Estimation of the deterrence rate 
To estimate the deterrence rate we have adopted the approach proposed in Combe et al 
(2008). We did not modify their methodology, therefor  only a brief description of the main 
idea and results of its application on our database will be provided. In a nutshell, authors 
consider a markovian process with two elements that are related to the cartel birth and its’ 
death that is associated with detection. Cartels inter-arrival time and duration between their 
birth and detection - are both random variables distributed exponentially and independently 
across cartels.11 The model allows calculating instantaneous probability of cartel detection 
through the maximum likelihood estimation method. Because the sample naturally contains 
only cartels that were detected, the estimated probability is conditional on that the cartel will 
be eventually detected. This value, in turn, represents the maximal bound of the global 
instantaneous probability of cartel detection (the sought-for deterrence rate). 
For our sample the estimated maximal annual probability of detection equals to 24%. It 
is significantly higher than the upper bound of thesame variable estimated  by Combe et al. 
(2008)  for the E.U. cartels prosecuted from 1969 to 2007 (12.9-13.3%%) that apparently 
witness for a more efficient antitrust enforcement in developing countries.12 A lower rate for 
the E.U. can be explained by inclusion into consideration of earlier years that are 
characterized with a weaker antitrust enforcement. A  additional explanation can be also 
offered. When cartel members are international corporations they often enter collusive 
agreements in several, often neighboring developing countries. Apart of the famous vitamins 
cartel, our sample includes, for instance, medical gas distribution cartels, prosecuted in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico in late 90s-early 2000s, or cement cartels that 
                                                          
11Because the cartel duration in our database is often not precise (for example, the year only was report d) we 
take the maximal duration for each of the cartels that contains complete months/years, unless  a more precise 
information is available. To see whether our data fi  model assumption of independency and exponential 
distribution we performed the same testing as in Bryant and Eckard (1991). Corresponding estimation results and 
graphs are available upon request. 
12Estimates for the E.U. are taken from  Combe et al (2008) and cover cartels prosecuted from 1969 to 2007. 
The maximal bound for the annual deterrence rate of 13% - 17% was estimated with a similar methodology f r a 
set of U.S. cartels. (See Bryant and  Eckard (1991).) However these result should not be compared with the one 
from our study as situation in the antitrust enforcement has significantly changed since the period that was 
considered by authors (from 1961 to 1988). 
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took place over the last 30 years in South Africa, Argentina, Egypt, Korea, Mexico and other 
developing countries. Evidence provided by other countries may serve as a trigger for local 
investigations and can facilitate the cartel detection, increasing, therefore, the deterrence rate. 
A maximal deterrence rate of 24% basically means that at least 3 out of 4 existing 
cartels remain uncovered. Therefore, we suggest that the actual economic harm caused by 
‘hard-core’ cartels in developing countries exceeds our estimations from the previous section 
at least fourfold. 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The competition policy implementation and enforcement, including cartel 
investigations, require substantial investments. Therefore, it is important to measure to which 
extent those expenditures are compensated in terms of prevented consumers’ damages. 
Especially this is relevant for developing competition authorities that often experience tough 
budget constraints. To provide the required evidence we have collected an original dataset 
that contains information on 249 major ‘hard-core’ cartels that were prosecuted in more than 
20 developing countries from 1995 to 2013.  
Descriptive statistics of our dataset of cartels do not bring any strong evidence to the 
widespread idea that developing countries are exposed to a higher cartel price overcharges 
than the developed ones. However, we do show that price overcharges are at least similar, 
which calls for adequate antitrust measures. We also show that the aggregated impact can be 
substantial. In terms of affected sales related to GDP the maximal rate reaches up to 6.38% 
(South Africa in 2002). The actual damage in terms of cartels’ excess profits is also 
significant, with maximal rates reaching almost 1% of GDP (South Korea in 2004 and South 
Africa in 2002).  
Study of Boyer and Kotchoni (2014) demonstrates on the sample from Connor 
(2010b) that data on price overcharges obtained from different methodologies, sources and 
contexts are asymmetric and heterogeneous, and therefor , are subject to a significant 
estimation bias. Non-biased estimates are, in fact,lower than simple medians calculated from 
the raw data. For example, bias correction reduces m dian price overcharge for the E.U. 
countries from 22.48% to 14.04% and from 16.67% to 13.58% for the U.S. and Canada.13 
                                                          
13Estimates from Boyer and Kotchoni (2014) were originally provided with respect to a ‘but-for’ prices, 
therefore they were recalculated with respect to the cartel price to be comparable with the other estimates in the 
paper. 
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Therefore, ideally, our own sample would require similar corrections to be made. We, 
nevertheless, insist that our aggregate damage estimates correspond to the very minimal 
bound of cartels’ effects. This is so because of at least six reasons.  
First, present study only takes into consideration cartel cases that are already closed. It, 
therefore, does not take into account neither cases under investigation nor those for which 
competition authority failed to prove its existence.  
Second reason is that economic data on convicted cartels are very poor. This is so 
because to condemn a cartel competition authorities rely mostly on the evidence of 
coordination activities rather than the economic one. Coupled with confidentiality issues, this 
reason resulted in elimination of multiple recorded cases from calculation of aggregate 
effects.  
Third, collusive practices harm consumers not only i  terms of inflationary effects, but 
also because they limit consumption. Our analysis demonstrates that, on average, a cartel 
decreases the production level by about 15% on the concerned market (see Table 3). Taking 
into account these output effects would provide more accuracy for our estimations. Our 
methodology allows one to calculate the losses in co sumers’ surplus that could serve to 
measure both changes - in prices and in quantities. However, in our sample its’ application is 
limited to only a few cartel cases with sufficient data.  
On top of this, our estimates do not take into account neither price umbrella effects14 
nor possible degradation in quality.15 
Fifth reason is that many of the cartelized industrie  produce intermediary goods, such 
as, for instant, cement or gas. Therefore the consequent price overcharge may proliferate 
further on other economic sectors, increasing the final impact manifold. By employing the 
country level input-output matrixes and corresponding industry pass-through rates together 
with estimated cartel excess profits one would be al  to i) assess the potential impact of 
those proliferations, and ii) define a set of industrie  that  have the highest damaging potential 
and therefore deserve a special attention from the competition authority. We find it as a very 
promising area for further development.   
                                                          
14Cartels can potentially cause a price umbrella effect as remaining firms could have more incentives to charge 
higher prices facing a price increase from cartel mmbers. 
15Even though our model does not allow the quality characteristics to change, the degradations in quality can 
still appear as colluding firms may have less incentiv  to maintain it. 
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The final, but probably the most important reason fr our estimates to reflect only the 
minimal bound, is the hidden nature of cartels. As we estimate the maximal annual probability 
of uncovering an existing cartel to be around 24%, we suggest that the actual economic 
damage resulting from collusive practices in developing countries is at least 4 times bigger 
that suggested by our estimations. 
We have also demonstrated that even this minimal estimated economic harm for the 
majority of considered countries significantly exceeds the expenditures to maintain the 
functionality of the relevant antitrust body. This may serve as a sought-for evidence for the 
competition authorities who wish to justify the requirement for an additional budget to 
improve the cartel deterrence and detection. More than that, developing competition 
authorities may wish to take advantage of the proposed methodology for their own cartel 
investigations as it will reduce the data required to estimate the economic damages. The 
efficiency of the penalty rule can be then assessed by comparing the imposed fines with 
cartels’ excess profits. Actual penalty - excess profits rates could be compared against 
relevant benchmarks that are considered by the competition authority as optimal.  
The last, but not the least, the created cartels database may be seen as a reference list 
containing industries that are potentially vulnerable to collusive behavior. Cartel members 
often enter into collusive agreements in multiple, often neighboring, economies. Therefore, 
evidence from other countries can (and should) be employed by competition authorities in 
local investigations. This may encourage countries to create a worldwide platform that would 
allow sharing and maintaining the common cartel datab se, for instance, on the basis of the 
International Competition Network (ICN). 
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1. Introduction 
To assess whether a merger between two competitors can potentially generate 
significant anticompetitive effects, including price increases, competition authorities bring the 
merger proposal through a merger evaluation process.  This process can appear to be very 
costly both for the competition authorities and the parties involved. In this perspective, 
countries adopt merger guidelines with recommended rules and procedures simple enough to 
facilitate the merger control process and improve its’ efficiency.  
Given the diversity and different levels of development of merger guidelines among 
countries, we base our discussion on the most recent ones enacted in 2004 in the E.U. and in 
2010 in the U.S. Among the proposed tools that aim t gauging the possible anticompetitive 
post-merger effects, the European guidelines offer the so called SIEC (“significant 
impediment to effective competition”) test. Though the description of the SIEC test is quite 
extensive, no particular procedures are recommended. To date, the most advanced tool that 
can be used for implementation of this test that allows assessing the post-merger price 
changes involves simulation of a merger based on an economic model of competition. 
Parameters of this model are either calibrated from different and often incomplete sources to 
match with the real market data, or estimated based on datasets that permit applying statistical 
estimation methods. This method requires not only a large amount of data, but also substantial 
expertise. That is why competition authorities consta tly seek for less sophisticated methods, 
which along with their simplicity would provide a sufficient level of accuracy. Recently 
proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (2010) the Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) test is intended to 
fit these requirements. It already features in the U.S. merger guidelines of 2010 and some 
elements of it are as well present in the U.K. merger uidelines of 2010. It is now under a 
heavy discussion whether it could be a good alternaive to merger simulations. Among the 
other instruments proposed in the guidelines, the most traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) still plays a role, at least as an initial rigger for a merger investigation. 
Based on distinct economic models and underlying assumptions, the HHI and the UPP 
tests could naturally differ in their predictive power. Our purpose is to test the accuracy of 
these tools and, more importantly, to characterize economic situations that lead to wrong 
predictions. For both tests the accuracy can be measur d in terms of type-I and type-II errors. 
Type–I error is associated with the case when a test flags merger as potentially detrimental for 
consumers (e.g. causing significant price increase), while it is actually not. In turn, type-II 
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error occurs when the test failed to diagnose a merger that is indeed harmful. It is important to 
track both types of errors. If these tests are used a  screening tools, then a type-I error leads to 
unjustified budget expenses as it triggers the phase-II of the merger assessment procedure, 
while a type-II one results in consumers’ welfare losses. 
To reach the goal set above, one can proceed in several possible ways. For example, a 
set of realized mergers could be analyzed. Then the actual post-merger effects could be 
revealed by comparing pre-and post-merger data. Type-II error level for each of the tests can 
be further estimated by matching these observations with decisions based on merger-assessing 
tools. This type of approach has been used, for example, by Okpanachi (2011), Kwoka 
(2012), Neven and Roller (2000). There are, however, at least two potential problems that this 
method entails. Evaluating merger decisions by comparing pre- and post-merger data can be 
misleading because new elements may blur the environment that was prevailing when the 
merger happened. Besides, it only allows one to assess the accuracy of the tests in terms of 
type-II error. 
Our approach is aimed at avoiding these drawbacks. We create, by implementing Monte 
Carlo simulations, a large sample of economies that is further used as a workbench to measure 
the effects of mergers and to evaluate how the chosen tools perform. A great advantage of this 
approach is that it provides all the information about the economies and its agents and, 
therefore, allows controlling for the pre- and post-merger economic environment. 
Precisely, we simulate 100,000 economies, each comprising i) consumers whose 
preferences are generated by a random utility model and ii) an oligopoly market structure with 
single-product firms producing differentiated products and compete à la Bertrand-Nash. 
Number of firms is set to nine as the lowest one that allows obtaining a sufficient number of 
observation with post-merger HHI levels below and above the current US guidelines’ 
thresholds. Marginal costs are assumed to be constant. A sampling process, therefore, 
involves distributions for products’ characteristic, onsumers’ preferences and firms’ costs 
elements. Distributions’ parameters vary from one economy to another that allows generating 
highly heterogeneous economic situations. 
The simulation process follows these steps: i) the nature draws the quality of products 
including the quality of the outside good that is not sold by any firm present on the market,  
consumer tastes and cost components; ii) firms compute expected market shares and compete 
in prices; iii) the Nash equilibrium is solved for prices; iv) consumers make their final choice 
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given prices. Then we use this setup to merge firms and to compute x post merger equilibria. 
We assume, without loss of generality, that a merger takes place between the first two firms 
and that the merger does not generate any cost efficienc es.  
From the initially generated sample we have removed observations that contained 
elasticity outliers as well as those that did not satisfy the equilibrium second order conditions 
or where our algorithm did not converge while solving for the equilibrium. This leaves us 
with a final sample composed of 41851 economies. A more detailed description of the 
simulation and cleaning processes are provided in Appendix D. 
 Given the assumptions underlying the simulation process, in particular, distributional 
assumptions, it is needed to evaluate its capacity to provide reasonably “realistic” economies. 
We find that the extreme values of main economic variables in the final sample, such as 
elasticities or market shares, lie in reasonable ranges, while providing sufficient 
differentiation (see Table 1). For instance, values taken by the aggregate demand elasticity 
show that we span a large range of economies with demands varying from highly inelastic     
(-0.0001) to highly elastic one (-15.87).  
In real economic environment some potential consumers can be present on the market 
without buying any of J products. The model that we have chosen to create the workbench 
incorporates this possibility – it allows consumers to chose the so-called ‘outside option’, 
including not buying at all. The share of the outside option is denoted as 0s . Therefore, in our 
analysis we make a distinction between the market share  that do take into account the 
‘outside option’ and those that don’t. The former we call ‘true’  market shares (s), for the 
latter we employed an upper bar and further call them ‘observed’ )(s .16  In our sample, the 
observed market share of the first merging firm varies from 0,01% to 93.6%, and similar for 
the second one, providing various levels of pre- and post-merger market concentration. 
  
                                                          
16If 0s is the market share of the outside option, then observed and true market shares of product j are linked in 
the following way: ( )01j js s s= − . 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main parameters of the economic model  
(0% cost efficiency) 
 
In contrast with the HHI, the UPP index has an inherit capacity to take into account 
merger-specific cost efficiencies. As we explain in Section 3, absent cost efficiencies the 
original UPP test will always flag mergers for further scrutiny. Therefore, to diversify the 
outcomes of its’ implementation we simulate also a second set of economies where mergers 
generate 2% reduction in marginal costs. We explain our choice regarding the efficiency level 
in Section 3 of the present chapter devoted to the UPP test. A larger set of descriptive 
statistics for both samples can be found in Appendix D.  
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 offers a critical appraisal of 
the HHI test based on the set of simulated economies w th no cost efficiencies. Section 3 
starts with the definition of the original UPP test and its theoretical background. It also 
introduces the existing UPP variants. Based on the second workbench with 2% cost 
efficiencies, we further perform an assessment of the accuracy of the UPP test and some of 
the considered variants when it is employed to predict the price change direction. We also 
show a way in which the UPP index can be employed to es imate the price change magnitude 
and demonstrate which of the considered variants provides the most accurate approximations. 
Our ultimate task consists in identifying the economic conditions that affect the accuracy of 
these merger evaluation tools and that can be potentially observed by the analyst in practice. 
Section 4 concludes the paper. 
Parameters Mean Variance Min Max 
Own price demand elasticity, 1st firm -6.925 4.041 -30.167 -1.794 
Own price demand elasticity, 2nd firm -6.919 4.030 -30.256 -1.811 
Cross price demand elasticity , 12ε  0.512 0.669 0.003 6.993 
Cross price demand elasticity, 21ε  0.509 0.665 0.002 6.891 
Aggregate demand elasticity -2.170 1.770 -15.866 -0.0001 
Market share of the outside alternative,0
s
 0.686 0.227 0.000 0.997 
Market share of the 1stfirm  (true) 0.034 0.039 0.00 2 0.354 
Market share of the 2nd firm  (true) 0.034 0.040 0.00 2 0.433 
Market share of the 1stfirm  (observed) 0.109 0.107 0.001 0.936 
Market share of the 2nd firm  (observed) 0.110 0.108 0.001 0.939 
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2. The HHI test 
The HHI test implementation traditionally requires three elements. The first two are the 
post-merger HHI and the difference of HHI between pre- and post-merger states (HHI∆ ). If 
J is the number of single-product firms identified by the competition authority as those 









= ∑  (1) 
where Jjs j ,1, = are the observed market shares.HHI∆ , in turn, characterizes the increase in 
market concentration caused by the merger: 
 1 2HHI HHI HHI 20000post merger pre merger s s− −∆ = − =  (2) 
Calculation of both HHI∆  and post-merger HHI presumes that the individual mrket 
shares of all firms on the market do not change post-merger. The third element that one needs 
to implement the test is a set of thresholds for both post-merger HHI and HHI∆ . According 
to the U.S. merger guidelines of 2010, once one of the thresholds is exceeded, the merger can 
potentially raise anticompetitive concerns, therefor  it cannot be cleared and a further scrutiny 
is recommended.   
In a Cournot model with homogenous products and fixed elasticity of demand the HHI 
is proportional to the margin over the weighted aver g  of marginal costs of all firms.17 This 
property legitimates the HHI as a measure of the market power and as a test to flag potentially 
harmful mergers. However, it might be then inaccurate when applied to a differentiated 
product market with Bertrand conduct. Present paper ims at verifying whether it is indeed so. 
Let us first discuss some general properties of the HHI test. Consider a market with 
2+M firms where, without loss of generality, the first two firms merge. Denote by 
1 2100( )C s s= +  the ex-ante observed market share of the merged entity, where1s and 2s are 
the market shares of firms 1 and 2 correspondingly. Assuming that M remaining non-merging 
firms are symmetric, the post-merger HHI and HHI∆ can be expressed as: 
 2 2HHI (100 ) /post merger C C M− = + −  (3) 
                                                          













where p is the market price, jmc  the marginal cost, js  the observed market 
share of firm j and ε  the aggregate demand elasticity. 




Equation (3) is the formula of a convex parabola with respect to 
coordinates of the minimal point: 
.HHI 5000 / ( (1 ))post MIN M M= ⋅ +
parabola with respect to1s  and reaches its maximum when the market shares of the merging 
firms are equal, C being fixed. Illustrations for both equations that include current US 
guidelines thresholds are provided on Graphs 1 and 2 correspondingly.
Graph 1: Relation of 
Graph 2: Relation of change in 
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1 1HHI 200 ( 100 )s C s∆ = ⋅ −  
C, with the following 
min HHI 100 / (1 )postC M= +
. The function for HHI∆  in Equation (4) is a reverse 
 
the HHI to the merged entity’s market share
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Graph 1 suggests that under condition of symmetry of non-merging firms any merger on 
a market with total number of firms less or equal 7 ( 5≤M ) will exceed the US guidelines 
post-merger HHI threshold of 1500, whether the market share of the merging entity C is high 
or nearly insignificant. Furthermore, according to the Graph 2, similar levels of the HHI∆  
that overpass the threshold of 100 can also correspond to quite distinct cases: for example to a 
case with a high *1s  and C=100, as well as to a case where the corresponding market shares 
are relatively low, e.g. 075.01 =s  and C=15. These examples suggest that the HHI test has a 
risk of not being able to differentiate between the situations with quite distinct positioning of 
the ‘to-be merged’ entity vis-à-vis competitors (interms of market shares), while one can 
expect the latter to be important in defining the potential effects of the proposed merger.  
While the illustrations above are informative, a more complex assessment of the ability 
of the HHI test to identify potentially harmful mergers seems plausible. To do so, we further 
employ the set of simulated economies with 0% cost efficiencies and apply the thresholds as 
in the US Merger Guidelines of 2010. 
As the HHI by construction is based on observed market shares, therefore it has a 
built-in sensitivity to the adopted market definition technique. However, we intentionally do 
not apply any of existing techniques to simulated economies before assessing the accuracy of 
the HHI test. The range of possible market definitio  approaches is sufficiently vast and can 
potentially result in quite distinct outcomes. Adopting just one of them could put under risk 
the robustness of our results. Our simulated workbench could enable one to assess the 
consistency of all existing techniques, but this deerves to be a subject rather of a distinct 
comprehensive study.  
It remains helpful, however, to assess the HHI performance in ‘ideal’ conditions, i.e. 
when observed market shares coincide with the true ones.  If we consider the share of the 
‘outside option’ as a measure of the quality of the market definition procedure, then a market 
with 0s  less than, let’s say, 0.05, can be considered as properly delineated. 0.8% of cases 
from our sample meet this requirement. We compared the results for sub-sample of 
economics with those obtained for the rest of the sample and summarized the results of the 
performed analysis below.  
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Result 1: Being applied to a differentiated product market the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) has a weak performance in identifying the potential for the post-merger price increase, 
whether the market is properly delineated or not. 
To illustrate this point we first plot on Graphs 3 and 4 below post-merger HHI and 
HHI∆  against the simulated price change (average for merging firms). Reference lines 
reflect 2010 US merger guidelines thresholds. A simple visual plot analysis shows no robust 
relationship between the post merger price change ad any of the two HHI components, even 
for the sub-sample of economies with properly delineated markets.  
Graph 3: Post merger HHI versus average price change of merging firms  
 
Graph 4: HHI∆ versus average price change of merging firms 
 
One can easily observe that high post-merger HHI values match with any kind of price 
changes, both high and low. The economic intuition behind the HHI suggests that higher 
market shares of the merging firms might be a result of a higher market power, thus a stronger 
ability of firms to raise prices. Therefore, since ∆HHI by construction depends on the 
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proportion of merging firms’ market shares (in contrast with the post-merger HHI that covers 
the whole market), in our experiment we should track some positive relationship between 
HHI∆ and post-merger price change. However, on the Graph 4 one can easily find cases 
where this intuition is not supported.  
The main criticism of the HHI test as a merger asses ment tool, along with ignorance of 
cost efficiencies and sensitivity to the market definition technique, is that it was developed for 
homogeneous good markets and so does not take into acc unt any of the product 
differentiation effects. When a merger happens on adifferentiated product market, it is not the 
size of market shares but rather the substitutabiliy between merging firms’ products and 
corresponding markups define the incentives to increase prices post-merger. (See, for 
instance, Farrell and Shapiro (2010)). We demonstrate this idea in more detail in the next 
section that is devoted to the UPP test. All those factors constitute a basis for misleading 
predictions of the HHI test and, therefore, reduce its’ accuracy. We measure the latter in terms 
of produced type-I and type-II errors. 
In order to characterize the errors we need to apply an ad hoc criterion indicating when 
a merger is detrimental. There are several possibilities whether we use price increase or 
welfare decrease as a criterion. Ideally our results should be robust to any specification. Since 
product quality characteristics are assumed constant, we decide to fix a threshold for price 
increase on 2% level under which the merger is considered as not detrimental and thus should 
not be challenged. Applying 2010 U.S. guidelines’ thresholds, we assume that mergers 
involving an increase in the ∆HHI of less than 100 points or a post-merger HHI of less than 
1500 are unlikely to have adverse competition effects and require no further analysis. On the 
other hand, all other cases potentially raise significant competition concerns. 
We define a type-I error case generated by the HHI test as a situation where average for 
merging firms price increase is below 2% together with the post-merger HHI greater than 
1500 or the ∆HHI greater than 100. A type-II error case for the HHI test occurs when price 
increase is greater than 2% together with the post-merger HHI less than 1500 and the ∆HHI 
less than 100. We also name as “predicted anticompetitive” a case when the HHI test well 
predicts detrimental merger and as “predicted pro-competitive” a case when the HHI test 
correctly identifies a non detrimental merger. In Table 2 below we display descriptive 
statistics for the main economic variables for these four sub-samples. 
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Here we do not apply any restriction on the market share of the outside option as it 
enables us to identify the potential importance of the proper market definition for the HHI test 
accuracy. 












Markup of the 1st merging firm 0.171 0.297 0.182 0.270 
Markup of the 2ndmerging firm 0.171 0.298 0.183 0.270 
Own price demand elasticity, 1st firm (11ε ) -7.552 -3.790 -7.233 -4.397 
Own price demand elasticity, 2nd  firm ( 22ε ) -7.549 -3.807 -7.088 -4.394 
Cross price demand elasticity ,1st firm (12ε ) 0.426 0.513 0.311 0.885 
Cross price demand elasticity, 2nd  firm ( 21ε ) 0.425 0.488 0.328 0.873 
Aggregate demand elasticity -2.447 -0.618 -2.225 -1.063 
Share of the outside alternative 0.725 0.358 0.612 0.541 
Market share of the 1stfirm, 1s (true) 0.028 0.036 0.027 0.061 
Market share of the 2nd firm, 
2s (true) 0.028 0.039 0.026 0.062 
Sum of observed market shares )( 21 ss +  0.204 0.117 0.134 0.296 
Number of observations 32904 217 743 7987 
First note that the number of cases in each of the four sub-samples is not informative per 
se. It depends on the structure of the simulated sample of economies as well as the price 
increase threshold and the HHI test definition (different in the U.S. and the E.U.). The 
breakdown can vary significantly depending on the model primitives that we use for 
simulations. What we need is to have a sufficient number of observations in each sub-sample 
in order to identify some striking features. We acknowledge that there are not so many 
observations in type-II error sub-sample, especially because with 9 firms post-merger HHI 
rarely goes below 1500. 
To assess whether the group averages are statistically different and can be employed for 
identification of the economic conditions that favor type-I and type-II errors we have 
performed group means comparisons of the parameters pr sented in Table 2.
18
  The results 
                                                          
18 After checking corresponding datasets for normality we performed t-test for group means comparisons. Both 
equal (pooled t-test)  and non-equal (Cochran-Cox and Satterthwaite t-tests) group variances are assumed. 
Relevant tables can be provided upon request. 
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suggests that type-I error cases arise when the merging firms enjoy relatively low markups, 
high share of the outside option and elastic demands: own-price and aggregate elasticities are 
quite high (in absolute terms) compared to anti-competitive sub-samples. Relatively high 
own-price and aggregated demand elasticities explain low markups and justify the fact that 
merging firms were unable to significantly increase prices post-merger. A strong outside 
option is consistent with high aggregate elasticity. 19 It also causes the ‘observed’ market 
shares that are employed for the HHI test to exceed th  ‘true’ ones significantly, which 
increases the probability to over-pass the guidelines’ thresholds, resulting, thus, in a type-I 
error. However, similar economic parameters also characterize the predicted pro-competitive 
sub-sample, that is only different from the type-I error sub-sample in its observed 
concentration level - the sum of market shares of merging firms in predicted pro-competitive 
cases is significantly lower (13.4% against 20.4%, see Table 2).  A conclusion that can be 
drawn from this analysis is that risk of producing a type-I error does not depend on the 
economic environment of the merger, but rather on the adopted concentration threshold. 
Type-II errors, in turn, are associated with the lowest share of the outside option and 
inelastic demand - this sub-sample displays the lowest (in absolute terms) aggregate elasticity. 
Merging firms have low true market shares and own-price elasticities, also quite high 
markups which reveal them as ‘niche’ players and increase firms’ incentives to increase prices 
(see Farrell and Shapiro (2010)). Because of the weak outside option observed market shares 
of merging products are not overestimated and remain low, which, together with relatively 
low market share of the merged firm, explains why HHI thresholds were not over-passed. 
Therefore, even when relevant market is better delineated (i.e. share of the outside option is 
the lowest among the four considered groups), the HHI test seems to remain ‘blind’ for the 
economic effects that drive the post-merger price dynamics on a differentiated products 
market where firms compete a la Bertrand. 
In part because of the drawbacks of the HHI test and lso because full merger 
simulation methods are often deemed too sophisticated, the Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) 
test was proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (2010) as a tool to flag potentially harmful mergers. 
A newly designed instrument is simple enough to be easily implemented while well 
economically grounded. 
                                                          
19 Share of the outside option is not directly observable by competition authorities, therefore in practice one can 
refer to the aggregate elasticity, since both variables are strongly linked. Otherwise, for several demand systems 
that allow for an outside option, including some discrete choice demand models, this dependence can often take 
a form of a closed-form function that can be used to estimate the sought-for parameter. 
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3. The UPP test 
3.1 Definition and variants 
A key question that the original UPP test is aimed to answer is whether a merger gives 
to the merging firm in question an incentive to increase its price or not. The implementation 
procedure consists in comparing two controversial effects that a merger creates: a loss in 
competition between merging firms that pushes the price upwards, and generated (if any) cost 
efficiencies that offset the first effect. Farrell and Shapiro (2010) propose a way of measuring 
these two effects so that they can be compared in a simple manner. Precisely, they suggest 
that the net upward pricing pressure for the firm  when merging with the firm j, denoted as 
1
iUPP , can be calculated as follows: 
 ****1 )( iijjiji cEcpDUPP −−=  (5) 
where *ijD is the pre-merger diversion ratio (a positive value) from product i to product j when 
price of product i increases, *jp and 
*
jc  are the pre-merger price and (constant) marginal costs 
of product j. iE  is a constant fraction of marginal costs. The first element in the formula,
)( *** jjij cpD − , accounts for the positive pricing pressure, while
*
ii cE reflects the offsetting 
effect of merger-specific cost efficiencies that can be delivered by the firm i. Note that the 
upper-index in 1UPPi is used to distinguish herein different variants of the UPP value. We 
introduce them below in the section. 
Farrell and Shapiro suggest the following implementation of the test: the merging firm i 
has an incentive to increase its price whenever 1UPPi  is positive. To explain the intuition 
behind we should refer to their Proposition 2 where it is stated that the pricing effects of a 
horizontal merger are similar to those when each of merging firms is simultaneously imposed 
a certain per-unit firm–specific tax. The value of this tax for the firm i merging with firm j 







i cpDt −=  (6) 
where mijD  is a post-merger diversion ratio of product i to product j, 
m
jp  and 
m
jc  are post-
merger price and marginal costs of the firm j ( subscript m is referred to the post-merger 
equilibrium). Hereinafter we call these specific values “merger taxes”. 
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Finding an analogy between the structural industry change such as merger and 
introduction of firm-specific taxes is quite intuitive. A horizontal merger indeed creates an 
opportunity cost for merging partners if they keep their prices on the pre-merger level. This 
opportunity cost arises because a possible shift in prices could have raised total profits of the 
merged entity: now if consumers would switch to the partner then revenues would still remain 
within the merged firm. The merger tax is the exact measure of these alternative costs that are 
specific to each of the merging partners. Using the analogy with a cost shock, a firm facing a 
positive merger tax has an incentive to increase its own price.20  
The Proposition 2 in Farrell and Shapiro (2010) was derived for a case of a duopoly 
and was not tied to any particular competition mode, be it Cournot or Bertrand. Jaffe and 
Weyl (2011) illustrate that this intuition is also valid for a more general case with non-
constant marginal costs and for any market larger than a duopoly. Note that the original 
formula from Farrell and Shapiro (2010) that is given in (6) does not account for possible 
post-merger cost efficiencies. When they are present, one should take them into account in the 
similar manner as in (5), such that: 










i cEcpDt −−= )(   (6.1)  
An attentive reader could have already noticed that t e computation of the merger tax 
requires the knowledge of the variable of the interest, namely the post-merger price. Farrell 
and Shapiro (2010) address this issue by proposing an approximation of the merger tax that 
uses only pre-merger data – the 1UPP  as defined in (5). The main criticism of the 1UPP  is 
that it can only be considered as a first round approximation of the merger tax, i.e. when the 
prices of the other firms remain fixed on the pre-mrger level. In other words, it ignores the 
feedback of the other market agents and therefore can potentially require less efficiency to 
eliminate the price pressure.  
To incorporate some of the missing feedbacks, a modification of the original 1UPPi   
formula was proposed by Schmalensee (2009). It takes into account the fact that cost 
efficiencies of the second merging firm will increas  its margin, thus increasing further 
pricing pressure of the first firm: 
 * * * *UPP ( (1 ) )SHMi ij j j j i iD p E c E c= − − −  (7) 
                                                          
20 This might not be true in a perfect competition model, where firm’s price would remain unchanged. Because 
perfect competition is rather a theoretical concept, we exclude it from consideration and assume that a firm 
facing a cost shock would have an incentive to change her price at least slightly. 
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Farrell and Shapiro (2010) went even further in including possible feedbacks. Building 
on the work of Werden (1996), and assuming that margin l costs and diversion ratios are 
constant, they have derived an even more complex version of the UPP value, denoted further 
as 2UPP : 
 2 * * * * * * * *UPP ( ) [ (1 )], , 1,2i ij j j i i ij ji i i iD p c E c D D p c E i j= − − ⋅ + − − =  (8) 
Or alternatively 
 2 1 * * * *UPP [ (1 )], , 1,2i i ij ji i i iUPP D D p c E i j= + − − =  (9) 
Note, that by construction both 
2UPP and UPP
SHM
 are always larger than
1UPP , 
therefore they would require more cost efficiencies to offset the pricing pressure.  This would 
potentially result in more mergers being flagged for urther scrutiny, increasing thus 
probability of a type-I error and decreasing that of a type-II one. 
A great advantage of any UPP-like test against a full merger simulation is that it allows 
getting along without any structural demand and cost function estimation and market 
definition procedures. Epstein and Rubinfeld (2010) constructed a UPP index that, while 
keeping these advantages, represents a special case of m rger simulation and indicate the 
same price change sign if calibrated consistently. Saying this implies that the new index 
incorporates the link between change in the price of pr duct 2 and the change in the price of 
product 1 that determines the post-merger equilibrium, i.e. the “feedback” that is missing in 
the original UPP of Farrell and Shapiro (2010). According to Epstein and Rubinfeld (2010), 
for a merger that involves two single-product firms that are Bertrand competitors, assuming 
that marginal costs and diversion ratios are constant, the upward pricing pressure for the firm i 
shall be calculated as following:  
 
* * * * * * **
*
* *
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and therefore they always agree in sign (as the divrsion ratio never exceeds 1). 
Consequently, it does not matter which of the two variants one uses to predict the price 
change sign. 
Interestingly, 2UPP  and ERUPP  differ in magnitudes even though they were derived in a 
similar manner and under the same set of assumptions. Both values were extracted from the 
inequality that defines the absolute efficiency level that is still needed to leave the price on the 
pre-merger level. The word ‘still’ is employed because the efficiencies that the merger is 
supposed to generate were already taken into account in the UPP values. This approach 
suggests that when 2UPP  or ERUPP  is positive, then assumed cost efficiencies are not e ugh 
to offset the pricing pressure, and therefore merging f rms have incentives to increase their 
prices.  While the magnitude of ERUPP corresponds to the magnitude of these ‘still needed’ 
efficiencies, magnitude of the 2UPP does not have any similar reference because both sides of 
the underlying inequality were divided by a positive constant. 
Unlike the HHI test, the UPP test in all variants has an inherent capacity to take into 
account cost efficiencies generated by the merger. The UPP value in its original version          
( 1UPP ), absent cost efficiencies will always take positive values, thus will always flag a 
merger for further scrutiny.21 Therefore, to assess the UPP test performance in this section we 
will use the second sample of economies where merging firms enjoy the 2% efficiency gains 
level applied to pre-merger marginal costs. We intentionally avoid setting a higher efficiency 
level. As the true values of pre-merger marginal costs are assumed to be known, therefore, the 
component of the UPP that is responsible for the downward pricing pressure is exactly the 
same as in the respective merger tax. Hence, the risk of the UPP value to deviate from the 
merger tax appears due to the component that reflects the upward pricing pressure. Assuming 
a sufficiently low level of generated cost efficiencies prevents it from being a dominant 
component of the UPP value and reinforces the role of the other one. 
Since cost efficiencies have an offsetting effect on the price pressure experienced by 
merging firms in the second sample we observe lower levels of the post-merger price change: 
0.413% against 1.914% in average for the first merging firm with the minimal level of             
-2.778% against -0.427%.22 This is a desirable feature as we want to test the ability of the 
                                                          
21 2UPP and SHMUPP   would also take only positive values as they by construction exceed the 1UPP . 
22 Negative price changes for a merging firm can appear in mergers even absent cost efficiencies in the presence 
of negative cross pass –through rates. For more details see Chapter 3 of the present thesis. 
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UPP test to predict both positive and negative price changes. A full set of descriptive 
characteristics of the sample of simulated economies is provided in Table D-2 in Appendix D.  
3.2 Limitations of the existing UPP-like tests 
UPP test was intended to be a simple tool that catches the essence of the unilateral 
effects of mergers. Indeed, its calculation for any of the considered above four variants 
requires only the knowledge of diversion ratios, pre-merger markups and assumed level of 
cost efficiencies. Not surprisingly it arouses a huge interest of competition authorities that 
often struggle to find the relevant expertise or sufficient resources to perform a full merger 
simulation. However, the implementation of the UPP test in practice is still subject to 
extensive critics. We discuss the most important issue  just below. 
First, all considered above UPP formulas are designd for a single-product case. To 
address this issue, Jaffe and Weyl (2011) extend the 1UPP  formula to the multiproduct 
setting, although it increases significantly the amount of required data. Because our 
simulations are restricted to a single-product case, w  omit this UPP variant in further 
analysis.  
Second, when estimates of diversion ratios or margin l costs are not available to a 
competition authority they need to be approximated. A possible solution could be to make 
assumptions on demand or cost structure and obtain simple formulas to calculate the unknown 
parameters. Some examples of such assumptions and resulting approximations can be found, 
for instance, in Cheung (2011), Hausman, Moresi, and Rainey (2010)) or Jaffer and Weyl 
(2011). As we demonstrate in Section 3.4, approximations and simplifications often come at a 
cost of significant reductions in test’s accuracy.  
After all, being basically a ‘thumb up’ rule, the UPP test still misses one important 
property when compared to a merger simulation - the ability to predict magnitude of the price 
change. As demonstrated in the following sub-section, the link can still be provided. This is 
an important practical issue as competition authoriies may wish to adopt price increase 
tolerance levels that are distinct from zero.  
3.3 Relation between the UPP and magnitude of post-merger prices changes 
As we highlighted in the Section 3.1, a horizontal merger in terms of price effects is 
equivalent to a simultaneous introduction of per-unit merger taxes for both merging entities. 
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Just as if merging partners instead of actually merging would experience certain simultaneous 
firm-specific per-unit cost shocks. As demonstrated later in Chapter 3 of the present thesis, 
the final impact that it would have on the price of the firm i merging with firm j can be 
approximated as following:23  
 mjij
m
iiii tmtmdp +≈  (12) 
where iim  and ijm  are the pre-merger own and cross pass-through rates 
correspondingly.24  From our sample we are able to recover precise values of merger taxes 
and corresponding pass-through rates and, therefore, c mpare the true price change and its’ 
linear approximation as in (12). The Graph 5 below establishes a high level of fit. 
Graph 5: Comparison of the real price change and its linear approximation 
 
Note that in practice the values of the required merger taxes are not known. As 
motivated above, one instead can use the respective UPP values. Therefore, for each of the 






     
(13)  
where •UPP stands for any of the considered UPP variants that approximate the 
magnitude of the merger tax.25  
                                                          
23 It is essentially a linear approximation around the pre-merger equilibrium. 
24
Own pass - through rate measures the extent  to which t e firm passes its cost shock on consumers (in terms of 
price change). For instance, if price increases on 5 u its due to a 10 units cost increase (positive cost shock), then 
pass through rate is equal to 5/10=0.5. Cross pass-through rate, in turn, reflects the impact of the competitor’s 
cost shock on own price after re-equilibration of the economy.  
25 Recall that, in contrast with the ERUPP ,  magnitude of the 2UPP  cannot be treated as the absolute cost 
efficiencies that are required  to leave the prices on the pre-merger level. Therefore, magnitude s of the 
2UPP and 
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The idea to employ own pass-through rate together with the own UPP level to 
approximate price change is not new and was already proposed and discussed by some 
researchers in the field (see, for instance Farrell and Shapiro (2010), Simons and Coate (2010) 
and Jaffe and Weyl (2011)). In contrast with the existing literature, we insist that the UPP of 
the second merging firm shall be also taken into account together with the relevant cross pass-
through rate, in the manner suggested by the equation (13). We illustrate this and the other 
important points regarding the UPP test performance i  the next section. 
3.4 Performance of the UPP test 
While theoretical discussions around the UPP test are quite extensive, still only few 
researchers focused on the empirical estimation of its performance, especially on the test 
implementation issues when data are scarce. The most relevant work, performed by Cheung 
(2011), assesses the ability of 1UPP  test both as a “thumb up” rule and as a predictor of the 
price change magnitude. On a sample of 256 overlapping routes in the America West - US 
Airways merger that was completed in 2005 she demonstrates that, when structural demand 
estimation is used to calculate the UPP index, it generally provides accurate predictions in 
sign of a price change for a large range of cost effici ncies.26 Precisely, it gives wrong sign 
predictions for about 10% of observations. Following deas of Farrell and Shapiro (2010), 
Simons and Coate (2010) and Jaffe and Weyl (2011), she approximates the magnitude of the 
price change as a product of the 1UPP  and the corresponding own pass-through rate. She 
finds that, on average, for the whole range of considered cost efficiencies the UPP value is 
higher than the one predicted by the simulation model and that the two variables have a 
correlation of 0.89-0.93, depending on the efficieny level assumed. Analysis of formulas in 
(12) and (13) from the Section 3.3 in the present paper suggest that the observed by Cheung 
(2011) trend for price change overestimation is a natural result in the presence of significant 
negative cross-pass through rates that the author als  reports. More valuable from the 
practical point of view, Cheung (2011) also estimates the impact of approximations of the 
test’s ingredients on its accuracy. First, following the proposition of Pakes (2010), author uses 
1UPP  level itself to approximate the magnitude of the price change, which is equivalent 
assuming the own pass-through rate equal to one. She found that the correlation between the 
magnitude of the UPP and price change has lowered, but remained quite high (0.8 - 0.87).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the corresponding merger  tax cannot be compared. The last point makes the predictions obtained on the basis of 
the 
2UPP  potentially unreliable. 
26 Cheung uses a discrete-type random coefficient nested Logit model to estimate the demand system. 
Essays in Competition Policy 
PhD dissertation of Aleksandra Khimich, Toulouse School of Economics 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________  
- 50 - 
 
Second, assuming that demand is drawn from a simple Logit model, she calculated the 
diversion ratio using only the observed market shares.27 This approximation resulted in wrong 
sign predictions and poorer correlation to a much larger extent. The Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives that the Logit model features is a very specific behavioral pattern that 
might not be true in general. This particularity, along with adoption of the observed market 
shares instead of the true ones, may explain the drastic decrease in the accuracy of test. 
In the following sub-section we analyze the UPP performances on a larger and more 
differentiated set of economies that, as we expect, would provide more robustness to the 
results. Our approach allows assessing all the UPP variants mentioned above, namely the ones 
proposed by Farrell and Shapiro ( 1 2UPP , UPP), Schmalensee (UPPSHM ) and Epstein and 
Rubinfeld (UPPER ). Similarly to Cheung (2011) we consider UPP application for both price 
change sign and magnitude and assess the test performance when true and approximated 
values of the test ingredients are available. We adopt, however, a different way of measuring 
the accuracy of the predictions when it comes to the price change magnitude as we 
demonstrate that the correlation coefficient is not the most appropriate measure in this case. 
More innovatively, sub-section 3.4.3 offers an analysis of economic conditions that favor the 
test to produce misleading predictions.  
3.4.1 Ability to predict the sign and magnitude of changes in price 
In this section we re-define type-I error (false positive) as a case when the calculated 
UPP value is positive, while the firm has actually decreased its price post-merger. 
Correspondingly, type-II error (false negative) occurs when UPP is negative while we 
observed a price increase. When UPP test is employed as a screening tool, therefore it is more 
important to avoid type-II errors, as possible false-positive mistakes could be corrected on the 
second phase of merger investigation. In turn, type-I errors would entail an unjustified waste 
of budget and time resources. We also test the ability of the UPP to predict the price change 
magnitude in a way suggested by equation (13) and offer a specific way of measuring the 
accuracy in this case.  
In Table 3 below we display recorded type-I and type-II errors for all considered UPP 
test variants ( or ). Errors are measured in percentag  with 
                                                          
27









js  and is  are the ‘true’ market shares of the firm j and i correspondingly (Willig (1991)). 
In practice true market shares are often replaced by ‘observed’ ones. 
1 2UPP , UPP , UPPSHM UPPER
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respect to the whole sample size. At first we provide results for test implementation when true 
values of all ingredients are known. The corresponding line is denoted as ‘ • trueUPP1 ’. We also 
consider implementation of the UPP test with logit approximation of the diversion ratio 
(denoted as • itUPP log1 ). Because true market shares may not be known by the merger analyst, 
therefore we find it appropriate to consider also a diversion ratio approximation that uses the 
observed markets shares instead. 
Table 3: Assessment of the predictability of the price change sign by UPP test 
variants 
Notes: (*) We provide results for UPP2 and UPPER together because by construction they always predict the same 
sign changes direction. 
Note that one should not refer to absolute levels of type-I and type-II errors from Table 
3 and make a reference to the real world as these prcentage breakdowns hold for our sample 
only. Nevertheless, these results can be used to compare the relative performance of different 
UPP test variants and to assess the impact of approximations of the diversion ratio.  
We summarize the most striking result in the following statement. 
Result 3: Original  provides the minimal level of type-I error, but the maximal 
level of type-II one. This remains valid whether one employs true values for diversion ratio or 
its approximations. 
Already by construction  and  are larger than the original  that 
results in a higher probability of type-I error and a lower probability of type-II ones. As a 
consequence of the Logit approximation of diversion ratio accuracy of all the variants is 



















trueUPP1  Type-I 
0.03% 0.51% 0.19% 
Type-II 2.59% 0.77% 0.27% 
•
itUPP log1  (true market shares) Type-I 
2.65% 3.07% 3.01% 
Type-II 19.22% 18.49% 18.37% 
•
itUPP log1  (observed market shares) Type-I 
16.45% 20.14% 19.13% 
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observed market shares instead of the true ones increases the probability of type-I error even 
more, while decreasing the type-II one. Last observation can be explained by a simple fact 
that true market shares never exceed the observed on s, therefore diversion ratio (and, 
therefore, the corresponding UPP) becomes larger. 
Before moving to the formal analysis of the accuracy of predictions for the price change 
magnitude, it is useful to perform a visual assessment of the approximations suggested by 
(13). For this purpose, on the Graph 6 below where we plot the real price changes against 
those approximated as in (13) with different UPP variants. Inasmuch as simulated economies 
are diversified in scale, we display the data in %, rather than in absolute values. In this part of 
the analysis it would make sense to measure the accuracy of price change predictions in terms 
of closeness of the observations to the 950 reference line. 
Graph 6: Real versus approximated price change based on different UPP varints 







The visual assessment suggests that, while all price approximations can deviate 
significantly from the real price increase, 1UPP and SHMUPP  tend to rather underestimate it. 
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Inasmuch as in some areas of the graph the concentratio  of the observations is too high, 
further quantitative assessment seems plausible. 
It appears to be quite challenging to find an ideal w y to quantify the accuracy of the 
UPP –based predictions for the price change magnitude. The type-I and type-II errors 
approach can be too sensitive to the adopted price incr ase tolerance threshold. In turn, Mean 
Square Errors are scale dependent and the Pierson correlation coefficient does not ‘catch’ the 
slope distortion, nor it is sensitive to a possible constant bias.28 To verify whether the bias is 
indeed present, we ran a linear regression for the eal price change as dependent variable and 
its UPP-based approximations as explanatory ones, i.e. εββ +⋅+=
)1(
101
approxdpdp . We found 
that estimated intercepts are very small but always statistically significant, which indeed 
confirms that the correlation coefficient is not a credible measure of accuracy.29 R2 originating 
from this regression cannot be employed for comparisons neither because it assumes that one 
would include an intercept (bias) while calculating the price change approximation, which is 
not supposed to be the case. 
Considering the discussed drawbacks, Pierson correlation coefficient, mean square 
errors, and even R2 originating from the linear regression above would be only helpful to 
compare the performance of the UPP variants among themselves. All parameters would 
provide the same ranking, but, none of them would be helpful to answer the key question on 
how close those approximations would be to the factual observations. Finally, we considered a 
regression without intercept, i.e. εβ +⋅= approxdpdp 11 . Even though for this regression R
2 
becomes not informative as such, an analysis of β
 
estimates can potentially bring some 
interesting results. We suggest that in such a regression the closer the β  estimate gets to the 
unit, the most accurate the employed approximation is.  
Table 4 below contains β estimates for the considered UPP variants and various price 
change approximations. First line provides estimates assuming that price change 
approximation is build according to the equation (13) and all required data are known              
( )1(1
approxdp ). From the practical point of view, it also makes sense to consider price change 
approximations when input data are limited. For this reason we also look at the approximation 
that ignores the cross pass through effect, such that •⋅= true
approx UPPmdp 111
)2(
1 . Furthermore, 
                                                          
28 For example, a price change approximation that is lways three times as large as the true price change would 
have a correlation coefficient equal to 1, while those predictions cannot be considered as accurate. 
29 Respective tables can be provided upon request. 
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1 . As in the previous sub-section we also test the impact of the logit 
approximation of the diversion ratio with the use of true and observed market shares. Without 
loss of generality, estimations are performed for the first merging firm only. 
Table 4: Regression of the real price increase on its’ approximation 
(estimates of β coefficient,  standard deviation in brackets) 
* - significant on 99% level 
Analysis of Table 4 suggests that ignorance of cross pass through effects reduces 
accuracy of the price change approximations for all he variants, except - β estimates 
deviate further from the unit. Whether the diversion ratio needs to be approximated with its 
logit analog, the UPP test performance becomes extremely poor. 
In accordance with what could have been expected by looking at Graph 6, price change 
approximations based on 1UPP and SHMUPP  tend to underestimate the real price change – 
their β  estimates both exceed the unit. It also becomes evident that that price change 
approximations based on ERUPP  and 2UPP can be considered as the most accurate ones, 
even though none of 99% confidence intervals for theirβ  includes the unit.30  This can be 
explained, in part, by a higher proximity of those UPP variants with the merger tax. To 
illustrate this point, we run the following regressions: 
    εα +⋅=
•
11 UPPt
m       (14)  
                                                          
30 As standard deviations are extremely low (see Table 4), it assures that the confidence intervals for the 
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We suggest that the closer α  estimate gets to the unit, the better UPP variant 
approximates the respective merger tax. Table 5 provides obtained estimations. 
Table 5: Regression of the merger tax on the corresponding UPP values  





* - significant on 99% level 
The following statement summarizes the results of the above analysis. 
Result 5:  ERUPP and the 2UPP  variants, when employed as proposed in formula (13), 
provide the most accurate price change approximations. 
3.4.2 Economic conditions affecting the accuracy of the UPP test 
It remains important to understand the economic conditi s that favor the UPP test to 
produce misleading predictions. Being aware and verifying them, where possible, risks of 
committing a mistake can be eliminated or, at least, reduced.  
To result in a type-I error, the sign of the UPP should be positive, while the post-merger 
price is actually decreasing. Analysis of equation (12) suggests some intuition of why it may 
happen. If we assume that own pass through is never negative, therefore there are two 
possible reasons for the type-I error that one may consider – i) the UPP value and the relevant 
merger tax disagree in sign, and/or ii) second term in (12), that remains ignored in the original 
formulation of the UPP test, is negative and signifcant enough to offset the first term. Similar 
reasoning can be applied for the type-II errors. 
Our sample indeed contains observations where the merger tax and the UPP value in all 
variants do not have the same sign. We plot them on the Graph 7 below. For the sake of 
comparability we consider merger taxes and UPP values in percentage of the relevant price. 
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Graph 7: Comparison of sub-samples where merger tax disagree in sign with the UPP 
value (1st merging firm) 
 
First striking observation is that sign disagreement generally occurs when both variables 
are nearly insignificant – for majority of the observations the merger tax corresponds to less 
than 1% of the relevant price, especially for 1UPP and SHMUPP . It has an important 
implication for the practical implementation of the UPP test. If a competition authority sets a 
non-zero price tolerance level, let’s say, 2%, then the sign disagreement between UPP and 
merger tax will not play any significant role in the formation of errors.  
Second observation concerns the difference in sign disagreement pattern. For example, 
in contrast with the other variants, the 1UPP  features the sign disagreement with the merger 
tax mostly when it (UPP) is negative. Therefore, this variant can potentially induce a higher 
probability of type-II error than type-I one, that we indeed notice from Table 3 above.  
In Table 6 below we provide a tabulation of the considered sub-samples with sign 
disagreements: we separate cases according to the signs of the UPP value and corresponding 
merger tax. For these sub-samples we also provide information on cases that feature type-I or 
type-II error.  
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Table 6: Tabulation of observations according to selected criteria  






It appears that for negative UPP values in all variants sign disagreement with the merger 
tax transforms into a type-II error in majority of cases (2.21% out of 2.26% for 1UPP , 0.75% 
out of 0.79% for ERUPP  and 2UPP , 0.019% out of 0.023% for SHMUPP ). While for positive 
UPP values, sign disagreement with the merger tax transforms into type-I error only in some 
cases. 
Comparison of the results from Table 6 with Table 3 suggests that for 1UPP , 2UPP  and 
ERUPP  variants sign disagreement between values and corresponding merger tax explains the 
majority of generated type-II error cases. Precisely, it explains 85% (2.21% out of 2.59% in 
terms of total sample) of type-II error cases for 1UPP  and 97% of cases for 2UPP / ERUPP  
(0.75% out of 0.77%). As for type-I error, sign disagreement is present in 40%, 96% and 68% 
false positive cases for 1UPP , ERUPPUPP /2  and SHMUPP  correspondingly. 
Interestingly, even if the UPP would perfectly approximate (be equal to) the merger tax, 
one still would not be able to predict the sign of the price change with 100% accuracy. On
Graph 8 below we plot observations from our sample wh re merger tax and corresponding 
price change are not of the same sign. Therefore, there is still a need to look for other sources 
of the UPP test failure. 
  
 
Sample selection criteria 














Sub- sample  with 01 <
•UPP and 01 >
mt  2.26% 0.79% 0.023% 
Including  type-II errors 2.21% 0.75% 0.019% 
Sub- sample with 01 >





Including  type-I errors 0.012% 0.49% 0.13% 
1UPP
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Graph 8: Sub-sample of cases where the merger tax and real price change disagree in 
sign, 1st merging firm 
 
This brings us back to the equation (12) and its second term that, as we have explained 
above, can also be a cause of the type-I error when it is negative, or type-II one when positive. 
Type-I error, thus, may occur when the cross pass through and merger tax of the partner do 
not have the same sign. Note that this condition is rather necessary, but is not always 
sufficient. Alternatively, one can think of conditions under which the error never appears.31 
For instance, when UPP values (and corresponding mer er taxes) for both merging firms are 
positive (negative), then type-I error (type-II error) will not occur if the respective cross pass–
through rate is positive.  
Analysis of our workbench provides support to this intuition. We looked through the 
sample for cases where both UPP would be of the same sign, condition on the cross pass-
through sign would be satisfied but the test would still result in either type-I or type-II error. 
To focus on the cross pass-through effect we have eliminated observations where UPP and 
corresponding merger tax disagreed in sign. As before, we considered the test application for 
the first merging firm only. For none of the UPP variants we have recorded more than 2 cases 
and no observations were recorded for . The fact that we still have observed some cases 
that disagree with theoretical predictions we attribute to the fact that the post-merger price 
                                                          
31
 Farrell and Shapiro (2010) end up a similar theoretical result for the  and a particular case of a 
duopoly. Cheung (2011) suggests that for their results to hold in case when economy is larger than a duopoly, all 
cross pass-through rates should meet these assumptions, and not only those of merging firms’ products. In turn, 
as equation (12) implies, it is, in fact, sufficient to be aware of only own and cross pass-through rates of merging 
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change in (12) that we use as a base for the analysis is till an approximation and does not 
provide a 100% accurate fit to the real price change (see Graph 5). 
The statement below summarizes our findings. 
Result 6: The UPP test in its original formulation has two main sources of type-I and 
type-II errors. First is a sign disagreement between the UPP value and the respective merger 
tax. Second reason is the cross-pass through effect that remains ignored in the original 
formulation of the test. The higher the competition authority sets the price increase tolerance 
level, the less important becomes the first source. 
Intuitively it follows that both closeness of the UPP value to the merger tax and cross 
pass through effect affect also the accuracy of approximation of the price change magnitude 
expressed in (13). Even though we acknowledge an appealing demand for further research of 
conditions of the sign agreement and magnitude proximity between the UPP and the merger 
tax, we do not aim at covering this issue in the present paper. When it comes to the cross pass-
through effects, Table 4 indeed illustrates that taking them into account improves the price 
change approximations. This result coupled with the analysis that we have performed just 
above raises the demand for understanding the conditi s that determine the sign and the 
magnitude of the pass-through rates. 
 Those conditions are hard to derive explicitly on the theoretical level, especially for the 
industry with many firms. This complexity is related, in part, to the required inversion of 
corresponding matrices. (See, for example, Jaffe and Weyl (2011)). Nevertheless, existing 
literatures offers some intuition. Chapter 3 of the pr sent thesis summarizes the existing 
knowledge on this issue and offers a derivation of these conditions for a setting that is not 
limited to a particular demand or supply system. 32 It finds the following: 
i) Increasing (decreasing) marginal costs favor positive (negative) cross pass through; 
ii)  Demand which elasticity decreases (increases) with respect to the price of the 
respective competitor favors cross pass through to be positive (negative). 
Unfortunately, none of the two above conditions alone is generally sufficient to be sure 
about the sign of the cross pass through. Moreover, th  latter one is extremely difficult to 
verify in practice. Nevertheless, it is demonstrated that some simplifying assumptions may 
facilitate the practical implementation of these results. For example, when firms are 
                                                          
32 In  Chapter 3 it is required that  firms compete a-la Bertrand. This assumption, however, does not really limit 
the applicability of the results to our analysis as merger simulations often adopt this particular competition mode.   
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symmetric, it suffices to make sure that these two conditions above are satisfied to be 
confident about the sign of the cross pass through. Consequently, if marginal costs are 
constant, one only needs to verify the condition related to the demand elasticity. Moreover, 
under symmetry the significance of the cross pass through rate relative to the own pass 
through (in terms of magnitude) decreases with the number of firms on the market. The last 
result has a direct implication for the UPP test. With less number of firms cross pass-through 
effects would be stronger and the UPP test, therefore, can be expected to be less accurate. 
Recall that our simulation procedure takes marginal costs as constant. It is done so with 
a purpose to meet the assumption under which each of the UPP variants was developed. This 
allowed us to assess the performance of the test and identify its drawbacks in the most 
favorable conditions. Results from Chapter 3 of the pr sent thesis suggest that if marginal 
costs would be increasing, simulated economies would have a higher chance to feature 
positive cross pass -through rates, that in turn should decrease the probability of type-I and 
type-II errors. However, considering non-constant marginal costs would not only affect the 
cross-pass through rate, but also how well each of the UPP variants approximates the 
corresponding merger tax. And the latter, again, deserves to be a subject of a separate study. 
There are two last remarks that we find important to mention. 
First, some of our results from Section 3 can be attribu ed to a rather restrictive pass-
through matrix pattern of the simulated sample - own pass trough rates are concentrated 
around one and cross-pass through are nearly insignficant in most cases. (See Graph 9 and 
Table 7 below) 
Graph 9: Distribution histograms for own and cross pass through rates, 1st merging firm 
(sample with 2% cost efficiencies) 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for own and cross pass through rates, 1st merging firm 
 Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Own pass through rate 0.997 0.081 0.269 6.043 
Cross pass through rate 0.001 0.012 -0.411 0.424 
 
This explains why the absolute levels of both type-I and type-II errors in our sample are 
quite low and why logit approximation of the diversion ratio was more detrimental for the test 
accuracy than any of considered approximations of pass-through rates. Furthermore, a rougher 
approximation of the own pass through with the unit in 
)3(
1
approxdp resulted for some variants in 




approxdp ).  This is the result of the own pass through being in average slightly less 
than unit in our sample, therefore its approximation with the higher value compensated for the 
strategic component that has been ignored in both  
)3(
1
approxdp  and 
)2(
1
approxdp .  Similarly to our 
case, Froeb et al. (2005) obtain small cross-pass through rates (compared to the own pass 
through) in their merger simulation examples with various demand models. In Chapter 3 of 
the present thesis it is illustrated on a theoretical example with quite general demand and 
supply systems that the fact that cross pass-throug rates are of second-order relative to own-
pass through rates is rather a common rule, especially in n industry with many firms.33 
Second remark refers to the concordance of the cross pa s through signs pre- and post- 
merger. Jeffe and Weyl (2011) highlight that pass-through matrix elements can change both in 
sign and magnitude post-merger. Indeed, in 82% of ec nomies in our sample at least one of 
the cross pass-through rates of merging firms changed its sign from positive to negative. 
However, as equation (12) implies, the knowledge of only pre-merger pass-through rates is 
enough to define potential impact of the merger on prices. 
4. Conclusions 
Present study aims at assessing the accuracy of two screening instruments proposed in 
the US merger guidelines (2010) and featuring in some ther advance guidelines around the 
world. Precisely, it deals with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Upward Pricing 
Pressure (UPP) test that was developed by Farrell and Shapiro (2010). For this purpose we 
                                                          
33 It follows directly from the equilibrium second order conditions. 
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have created by Monte-Carlo simulations two sets  of heterogeneous and sufficiently realistic 
economies that were used as a workbench to measure the effects of mergers and to evaluate 
the performance of the selected tests.  
Our results confirm how misleading the use of the HHI can be when applied to an 
industry with differentiated products and Bertrand conduct. We find that  the HHI test seems 
to be ‘blind’ for the economic effects that drive the post-merger price dynamics and therefore 
type-I and type-II error levels depend rather on the adopted thresholds. 
More innovative, our computations show that the UPP test can also be misleading, even 
if one has perfect information on the main ingredients needed to compute it. In contrast with 
the HHI, the UPP test not only takes into account possible cost efficiencies, but also by 
construction deals with economic effects arising on a differentiated products market when a 
merger takes place. It is based on the idea that each of the merging firms faces a pricing 
pressure because of arising firm-specific alternative costs that the merger creates, that we call 
‘merger taxes’. UPP values calculated for those firms are approximations of the 
corresponding merger taxes.  Out of all considered UPP variants, the most accurate merger 
tax approximations in terms of magnitude and sign are provided by the ERUPP and 
2UPP . 
When employed together with corresponding pass through rates, as suggested by formulae 
(13), they provide also the most accurate approximations of the post–merger price change 
magnitude. 
When the UPP test is employed to assess the price change sign, the original 1UPP
variant demonstrates the minimal level of type-I error, but the maximal level of type-II one. 
This remains valid whether one employs true values for diversion ratio or its approximations. 
We show that the UPP test has two main features that cause both type-I and type-II errors for 
all variants.  
First feature is a possible sign disagreement between the UPP value and the respective 
merger tax. We find that it can indeed be the case and that it explains the majority of type II 
errors. We also find that sign disagreement appears mostly when both variables are extremely 
small with respect to the post-merger price change (less that 1% for all UPP variants). 
Therefore, if a competition authority sets a non-zero price tolerance level, let’s say, 2%, then 
this occurrence alone, even if eventually happens, ha  a very low risk to affect the test 
performance. 
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Second feature is the ignorance of the cross-pass through effect that is assumed in the 
original formulation of the UPP test. Nevertheless, we illustrate that when UPP values of both 
merging partners and the respective merger taxes are of the same sign, then positive cross 
pass-through rates guarantee that the risk of generati g a type-I or a type-II error is 
eliminated. Despite the fact that the sign of the cross pass through can change post-merger, 
our analysis suggest that one only needs to define it pr -merger. 
Even though the present study focuses only on single-product firms, it seems also 
plausible from the practical point of view to consider multi-product settings, including cases 
where some of the products can be considered as complements. A helping hand comes from 
Jaffe and Weyl (2011) who propose a multi-product UPP formula that could be employed in 
this case. To our knowledge, there are no studies that would cover the UPP performance in a 
multi-product environment; therefore, we see it as a very promising area for further research. 
Among the other possible extensions we can envision introducing the Cournot conduct, 
vertical relationships, etc.  It would be also usefl to assess the sensitivity of the type-I and 
type-II errors to adopted thresholds (i.e. price tol rance level, cost efficiency rate, etc.) by 
building correspondent distributions. The developed simulation tool is flexible enough to 
serve well in assessing the performance of the chosen for the present study merger guidelines 
tools (and not only) in all those cases. 
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A question of whether the proposed merger can potentially cause price increases 
traditionally remains in the core of merger investiga ons. Mostly because pricing effects can 
be measured in money terms and, therefore, they repres nt a direct and clear impact on 
consumers. To date, the merger simulation is the most advanced tool that competition 
authorities can employ to assess these effects. It i  build out of three main components: 
demand and supply systems and competitive interaction between firms. Based on a consistent 
oligopoly model calibrated to fit the observed premerger equilibrium, this procedure is 
employed to predict post-merger prices, outputs and other variables of the possible interest 
(for instance, change in consumers’ welfare). While being generally flexible and well 
economically grounded, merger simulation procedure has a significant drawback. By 
changing the underlying assumptions one is able to predict virtually any post-merger prices 
between marginal costs and the monopoly price. An example of such variations in predictions 
can be found in Froeb et al. (2005) who have performed a series of merger simulations for an 
(abandoned) WorldCom-Sprint merger. They have employed three different and commonly 
used demand systems - linear, constant elasticity and almost ideal (AIDS) demand systems - 
and demonstrated that price change predictions can vary significantly depending on the 
demand system chosen: from 2.3% for linear demand to 16.4% for isoelastic one. On a set of 
3000 mergers simulated via Monte-Carlo method, Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz and Werden 
(1999) also found that post-merger price predictions are very sensitive to the adopted demand 
system. Linear demand provided the lower price increase, following by the logit and AIDS 
demands. Log-linear configuration resulted in the highest price increase that was three time as 
big as the one associated with the linear demand. While these illustrations are informative, it 
is hard to understand the sources of such differencs because considered models differ in 
many respects, including assumptions on marginal costs and demand parameters. Having a 
clear idea about what these sources are could help to discriminate between different merger 
simulation settings and to verify whether the chosen one does not restrict a priori the expected 
post-merger price change. 
Literature on the subject suggests that demand’s curvature is one of the key 
determinants of the post-merger price change. Precisely, Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz and Werden 
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(1999)) found that convex demand functions generate highest post-merger price increases, 
while concave ones generate the lowest. However, thir study is silent about the sensitivity of 
results with respect to the form of the cost function. Intuitively, one would expect that both 
demand and supply systems characteristics play a role. In support for the latter idea, the 
mentioned above study of Froeb et al. (2005) empirically demonstrates that the magnitude of 
the post-merger price increase is positively correlated with the own pass-through rate. Own 
pass - through rate measures the extent to which the firm passes its cost shock on consumers 
(in terms of price change) and is indeed a function of both demand and supply system 
parameters (see, for instance, Weyl and Fabinger (2009)). 34 This explains also the results of 
Crooke, Froeb, Tschantz and Werden (1999)) as demand’s curvature is, in fact, one of the 
parameters affecting the own pass-through. Precisely, the class of ‘cost amplifying’ demand 
systems, i.e. those with the own pass through exceeding 1, includes those with log-convex 
functions, for example, constant elasticity demand. In turn, ‘cost absorbing’ demands 
functions (with the own pass through below 1) are log-concave as, for example, linear and 
homogeneous logit.35   
A theoretical support for the empirical findings from above comes from Jaffe and Weyl 
(2011) who have explained the role of the pass-through matrix in the post-merger price 
formation, elaborating on the first order conditions of the pre-merger equilibrium. Pass-
through matrix has own pass –through rates on diagonal, and cross pass- through rates below 
and above the diagonal, where cross pass - through rates measures the extent to which the 
firms’ own prices react on a cost shock of the competitor (after re-equilibration of the 
economy). Their result remains valid for an arbitrary conduct and cost functions.  
Note that the mentioned above empirical studies focus only on the own pass-through 
rate, while Jaffe and Weyl (2011) talk about the whole pass through matrix. As the present 
study demonstrates, ignorance of the role of the cross pass-through rate increases the risk of 
committing a mistake on various stages of the merger evaluation process, including market 
definition and assessment of unilateral and coordinated effects.  
                                                          
34 For instance, if price increases on 5 units due to a 10 units cost increase (positive cost shock), then e own 
pass-through rate is equal to 5/10=0.5. 
35The log - convexity/concavity of demand was established as a factor affecting the own pass-through of a 
monopoly facing constant marginal costs (see, for instance, Tyagi (1999)). Demand function )( pdi is said to be 
log concave if 0))(log( <′′pdi , and log convex otherwise.  Intuitively, this result can be applied in a multi-firms 
market as each of them can be seen as monopolist facing its own residual demand. 
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The paper will stick to the following outline. Section 2 introduces the adopted 
theoretical framework and illustrates how exactly the cross-pass through rate participates in 
the post-merger price formation. It also offers some examples illustrating how the neglecting 
of the cross-pass through sign and magnitude could lead to misleading conclusion on various 
stages of merger evaluation process. Section 3 provides a literature review regarding the 
economic conditions affecting the sign and magnitude of the cross pass-through rate. In 
Section 4 I perform a comprehensive analysis to examine the theoretical properties of the 
pass-through matrix derived for the setting from Section 2. I particularly focus on the cross 
pass-through rate and define demand and supply properties that affect its’ sign and magnitude. 
As results coming from the existing literature as well as those obtained in Section 4 often 
require symmetry, in Section 5 I test whether they old, at least to some extent, in a non 
symmetric environment. For this purpose I create by means of Monte-Carlo simulations 
100,000 sufficiently differentiated, realistic and on-symmetric economies and perform and 
empirical assessment of obtained theoretical results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The role of the cross-pass through rate in merger assessment 
It is a more common practice to use a Bertrand competitive interaction in merger 
simulations. This is so, in part, because the majority f markets can be seen as those with 
differentiated products, or those with homogenous products coupled with differentiated 
services. Therefore, present paper will adopt this setting too. For the sake of simplicity only 
horizontal merger between two single-product competitors are considered, assuming that this 
business arrangement does not generate any merger-specific cost efficiencies.36 
More formally, I consider an industry with J single product firms that produce 
substitutes and compete in prices to maximize their own profits
Jjpdpdcpp jjjjj ,1),())](([)( =⋅−=π , where )( pd j is a residual demand function for 


















, ))(( pdc jj  is a per-unit cost function 
and )...,( 21 Jpppp = is the price vector. To improve the representation further in the paper 
explanatory variables will be omitted, unless their presence makes sense. No other specific 
restrictions are imposed on demand or cost functions, except that both are (at least twice) 
differentiable. Without loss of generality, I assume that the first two firms merge. 
                                                          
36
Cost reductions due to economies of scale are still possible if allowed by the relevant cost functions. 
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Farrell and Shapiro (2010) in their Proposition 2 state that under assumption of constant 
marginal costs a horizontal merger has the same pric effects as if both merging firms would 
be simultaneously exposed to specific per-unit taxes. Hereinafter I call them ‘merger taxes’. 
This result was derived for a case of a duopoly, but it was not tied to any particular 
competition mode, be it Cournot or Bertrand. Jaffe and Weyl (2011) illustrate that this 
proposition is also valid for a more general case with non-constant marginal costs and for any 
market larger than a duopoly. A horizontal merger indeed creates an opportunity cost for both 
merging parties if they keep their prices on the pr-merger level – changing prices post-
merger could have raised total profits of the merged entity because some of the consumers 
would not be lost as they would switch to the partner. The ‘merger tax’ is a precise measure of 
these alternative costs that are specific to each of t e merging firms.  
In other words, post-merger firms set their prices as if they would simply face certain 
cost shocks. This allows for a linearization around the pre-merger equilibrium and, as a result, 
makes it possible to derive the following approximations for the post-merger price increases 
(see Appendix E for derivations):   
mm tmtmdp 2121111 +≈          (1) 
mm tmtmdp 1212222 +≈          (2) 
Jitmtmdp mi
m
ii ,3,2211 =+≈         (3) 
where Jimii ,1, =  are own pass-through rates and Jjimij ,1,, = are cross pass-through rates 
(price reaction of firm i on a cost shock of firm j), mt1 and 
mt2 are the ‘merger taxes’ for the firm 
1 and firm 2 correspondingly. 
There exist several approximations for the ‘merger tax’, including the pioneering UPP 
index, developed by Farrell and Shapiro (2010). See Chapter 2 for an overview of some of the 
existing approximations. Nonetheless, to date, there is no study that would explicitly consider 
properties of the ‘merger tax’ itself. In fact, different economic setting may imply 
significantly different values of this variable. What one can be sure about is that absent cost 
efficiencies it always takes positive values as it represents simply a product of a diversion 
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ratio and a post-merger markup (see Jaffe and Weyl (2011)).37 Therefore, as equations (1) and 
(2) suggest, all other things equal, own pass-through rate and predicted post merger price 
increase are indeed positively linked. However, as the examples below illustrate, cross-pass-
through effects are not negligible neither.  
First, while own pass-through is never negative, cross pass-through rate has no sign 
restrictions. (See, for instance, Chapter 2 of the present thesis, Froeb et al. (2005) or Besanko 
et al (2005) for empirical evidence.) A simple analysis of equations (1) or (2) suggests that 
when cross pass-through is significant it can overrid  the impact of the own pass-through and 
revert the sign of the price change.  Therefore, price decrease is theoretically possible even in 
the absence of any merger specific cost efficiencies. In a very extensive set of simulated 
mergers presented in Chapter 2 of the present thesis one indeed can observe some cases with 
price decrease for one of the merging firms. Different oligopoly settings adopted in merger 
simulations often restrict the cross pass-through pattern, affecting therefore the range of 
predicted post-merger prices and even their signs. 
Second, the accuracy of the implementation of the merger screening tools, such as, for 
instance, the UPP test, can also be affected.  The UPP test was designed by Farrell and 
Shapiro (2010) to diagnose merging firms’ incentives to increase their prices. The UPP value 
should be calculated for each of merging firms and, as was already mentioned above, appears 
to be an approximation of their specific ‘merger tax’. By analogy with analysis of the impact 
of the cost shock on price, whenever UPP value is positive the firm is said to have incentives 
to increase its price post-merger. However, the formulation of the test ignores the fact that 
second merging firm is also ‘exposed’ to a tax and, therefore, cross pass-through effects are 
present. Hence, positive UPP may not necessarily correspond to a positive post-merger price 
change whenever cross pass-through effect drives th price down. This implication is 
illustrated and discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 of the present thesis. 
Third, negative cross pass-through rates being featur d by non-merging firms would 
result in their post-merger price decrease (see equations in (3)). Drop in prices causes a 
positive impact on consumers’ surplus and in some cases can even override the negative 
effect caused by excessive pricing by merging firms. One can refer to the example in Higgins 
et al. (2005) that demonstrates that due to this effect, a merger can indeed benefit consumers, 
                                                          
37 We reasonably assume that diversion ratios are not qual to zero, otherwise considered products cannot be 
seen as substitutes. We also assume that firms always enjoy a positive markup, i.e. “ perfectly competitive” 
markets are excluded from consideration. 
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even if it does not generate any merger-specific cost efficiencies. Technically, authors do not 
operate in terms of cross pass-through rates, but rather in terms of strategic relationship 
between prices.38 These two concepts are inextricably linked – under some conditions a 
negative (positive) cross pass-through implies strategic substitutability (complementarity) of 
prices and vice versa. I discuss on this issue in more detail in the next section, nonetheless, I 
use this connection between the two concepts here to mo ivate the next points. 
Forth, the strategic substitutability may render inaccurate the price correlation approach 
that is sometimes used to define the relevant market. This approach looks at how price series 
evolve over time. There exist several price correlations tests, but all of them are based on a 
general idea that prices of goods from the same market would tend to move in the same 
directions (see Stigler and Sherwin (1985)). Therefore, the higher is price correlation, the 
most probably the considered goods are within the same market. If prices of two conventional 
substitutes are strategic substitutes, therefore, over time they may move in different directions. 
As this may exclude certain products from consideration, relevant market may appear too 
narrow, and, as a results of it, observed market share  will be overestimated. As a 
consequence, the HHI test, that still plays role in merger assessment practices, or any other 
concentration based test, would produce more false po itives, i.e. flag the merger in question 
as possibly harmful, while it is not. The example from Higgins et al. (2005) indeed illustrates 
that mergers on markets with strategic substitutes can be socially beneficial because firms 
face downward pricing effects. 
Finally, Potters and Suetens (2006) found experimental evidence that there is 
significantly more cooperation when agents’ actions exhibit strategic complementarities than 
in the case of strategic substitutes. They propose the following intuition. In case of strategic 
complements even a self-interested agent will partially follow a cooperative move made by 
another agent because the best response function has a positive slope. In case of strategic 
substitutes, an agent would at least partially off-set a cooperative move because the slope of 
the best response function is negative. When applied to the merger analysis, this result 
suggests that coordinated effects are weaker if firms see prices as strategic substitutes. 
To check whether the considered market features negativ  cross-pass through rates and 
whether they are significant relative to the own pass-through, one could perform an empirical 
                                                          
38 A notion of “strategic substitutability” and  “strategic complementarity” was introduced by Bulow et al (1983). 
Prices are said to be strategic substitutes (compleents) if corresponding reaction curve slope is negative 
(positive). 
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estimation of the whole pass-through matrix. However, doing so even for a part of it could 
appear very challenging. Instead, understanding the general economic conditions that 
influence the sign and magnitude of its elements would already be helpful. 
Existing literature that covers pass-through issues has a rather limited relevance to our 
problematic - it either deals with the own pass-through rate only or, if actually tackles the 
cross pass through, is often tailored to a particular setting and therefore cannot be employed in 
the present study.39 Nevertheless, some intuition that can still be gained from the few relevant 
existing theoretical and empirical studies that are discussed below. 
3. Literature review 
Assuming symmetry, constant marginal costs and a horizontal demand system, Weyl 
and Fabinger (2009) establish an explicit relationship between the magnitude of the own pass-
through and the sign of the cross pass-through rates. They demonstrate that the sign of 
)1( −iim  is opposite to the sign of Jjim ji ,1,, = .
40 In other words, if firm’s residual demand 
is ‘cost amplifying’ )1( >iim , then all relevant cross pass-through rates of competitors should 
be negative, and positive for a ‘cost absorbing’ demand )1( ≤iim .
41  
While it is common to assume that marginal costs are constant, not all of the 
traditionally employed in merger simulations demand functions imply horizontality. The class 
of horizontal demand systems includes, for example, linear demand systems and as a 
generalization of this, Horizontal Constant Pass-through Demand System (HCoPaDS), 
developed by Weyl and Fabinger (2009). Jaffe and Weyl (2011) argue that results of Gabaix 
et al. (2009) and Quint (2010) applied under symmetry imply horizontality as well for some 
general discreet choice models.  
Required symmetry, demand horizontality and rigidity of marginal costs remain an 
unfortunate limitation for the practical applicability of the results from Weyl and Fabinger 
(2009). Nevertheless, some empirical studies based on non symmetric markets end up with 
similar, though not exactly the same, conclusions. For instance, on a dataset of prices for a 
major U.S. supermarket chain Besanko et al (2005) investigated how manufacturers’ trade 
                                                          
39 For example, Loomis (1997) studies cross pass throug  effects that arise when firms compete in multiple 
markets, or Sudhir (2001) who considers pass-through effects when firms are interacting vertically. 
40 A demand system is called ‘horizontal’ if the price of a substitutable (complementary) good raises (lowers) a 
uniform upward (downward) shift in the own inverse demand. 
41 By ‘relevant’ cross pass-through here should be understood the reactions of all other firms on a costshock of a 
given firm. 
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promotions are passed on the retailers’ prices. Not only the own-brand, but also cross-brand 
retail pass-through rates were considered. A reduced-form approach that was employed 
allowed getting along without constraints that are usually imposed by structural models and 
therefore provided results that are less sensitive to the adopted framework. Authors found that 
brands with high own pass-through are more likely to generate negative cross-brand pass-
through for their competitors.42 
Next section of the paper contributes to the existing knowledge on the issues. It offers a 
comprehensive theoretical examination of the properties of the pass-through matrix derived 
for the setting presented in Section 2. As motivated above, cross pass-through rate will be 
kept in the focus as well as conditions affecting its s gn and magnitude. 
4. General properties of the pass-through matrix 
Consider a (pre-merger) pass-through matrix M  derived for the setting from Section 2. 
(See Appendix E for the derivations.) It is a JJ × matrix, with own pass-through rates 
Jimii ,1, = on the diagonal and cross pass-through rates ijm  in the upper and lower triangular 
parts. ijm stands for the cross pass-through rate that represents the reaction of firm i on the 
cost shock of firm j. First and second order conditions of the pre-merger equilibrium 
determine several interesting properties of the pass-through matrix. I discuss these and the 
other findings below, leaving all the technical details for the Appendix F. 
First, it is easy to show that the second order conditions of the pre-merger equilibrium 
ensure that all own pass-through rates are positive. Th refore, if the industry in question does 
not experience any cross pass-through effects, then a merger with positive merger taxes would 
certainly result in a price increase for both merging firms. This result follows directly from 
the analysis of equations (1)-(3) above. Recall that if the merger generates no cost efficiencies 
then the respective merger taxes are always positive. 
Second, the same equilibrium conditions cause the own cross pass-through rates to 
weakly dominate the cross pass-through ones, such that Jjimmm jjiiij ,1,),,max(max =≤ . 
An empirical evidence for this finding can be found, for instance, in Chapter 2 of the present 
thesis, in Froeb et al. (2005) or Besanko et al (2005). It is sometimes argued that this property 
might be a result of a particular demand or supply system that was adopted for merger 
                                                          
42 Even though authors consider vertical relationship, t eir result is relevant for the present study as retailers take 
input prices as fixed. 
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simulations. In Appendix F of the present study I show that for the setting employed this is 
rather a common rule.  Even though this property restricts the possible impact of cross pass-
through effects on post-merger prices, it should not be neglected, as various examples from 
Section 2 demonstrate.  
Third observation, that may not appear obvious, is that the pass-through matrix is 
generally not symmetric. In other words, ijm  and jim are not necessarily of the same 
magnitude, nor of the same sign. This is an unfortunate feature for a merger analyst who 
wants to take into account possible cross pass-throug  effects, especially when number of 
firms on the market is high. More than that, as Jaffe nd Weyl (2011) have highlighted, pre-
merger matrix is not generally equivalent to the post-merger one. Not simply because the 
latter shall be estimated at different (post-merger) price level, but also because of the 
structural changes that a merger causes.  In fact, some of cross pass-through rates can even 
change the sign to the opposite. While theoretical framework employed in the present study 
implies that one only needs the pre-merger pass-throug  rates to approximate the post-merger 
price changes, this property can imply large complexities if the analyst intends to take into 
account cost efficiencies that are supposed to materializ  at some point post-merger.43 
Whenever a cross pass-through becomes negative post-merger it may lead to counter-intuitive 
and, moreover, undesirable upward pricing pressure effects following from those cost savings.  
More than that, existing literature indeed shows that negative cross pass-through has a higher 
probability to be present if related products remain under common ownership (or managed 
together). See, for instance, Besanko et al (2005) or Chapter 2 of the present thesis. Even 
though the present study does not intend to cover this problematic, it remains an appealing 
topic that deserves further exploration. 
The last two matrix properties were derived for symmetric markets only. 




ij ,1,, =∀ decreases with the number of firms on the market, all other industry 
parameters kept equal.44 Of course, the more general property 
                                                          
43 So called “dynamic efficiencies” indeed come into effect  during relatively long period post-merger and may 
have, in fact, a more significant impact than standard short term (or instantaneous) cost savings. 
44 Similar result was derived by Weyl and Fabinger (2009) for a cross pass-through relative to the own pass-
through, although it was restricted for horizontal demand systems and constant marginal costs and also required 
symmetry.  
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Jjimmm jjiiij ,1,),,max(max =≤  remains valid too. As a consequence, a stronger 
downward post-merger pricing pressure due to a negativ  cross pass-through is more likely to 
appear on the market with fewer firms. This may be se n counterintuitive as a higher market 
concentration is usually associated with a stronger market power and thus a more significant 
post-merger price increase. Therefore this property may contribute to the decrease in the 
accuracy of the HHI test, or any other concentration-based test, whenever a negative cross 
pass-through is present. 
The final property of the pass-through matrix that arises under symmetry is that the sign 





∂ π2 .45 This finding allows deriving explicit conditions driving the sign of the 
cross pass-through rate. It is easy to show that:  






























































































Once all sign constraints imposed on demand functio derivatives are taken into 
account, one can detect two elements of the formula that don’t have sign constraints and 







, takes negative (positive) values when marginal costs decrease 














−  that is 
always positive under the adopted assumptions on demand functions. All other parameters 
equal, the more sensitive is the demand to the competitor’s price increase (the higher is 
ji pd ∂∂ ) the higher is the potential benefit (loss) of thefirm due to decreasing(increasing) 
marginal costs when it changes the output, and therefore the stronger its incentive to decrease 
(increase) price.  
                                                          
45 In case of duopoly this result remains valid without requiring the symmetry. 
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− , is negative (positive) if own residual demand becomes 









The intuition that links this 
property with the price change direction is quite simple. Let us consider a situation when a 
competitor raises its price due to an own positive cost shock. Then the firm in question would 
face an increase in demand reverted from the competitor.  If this makes own residual demand 
more elastic, than it becomes more profitable for this firm not to increase own price in 
response, but on the contrary, to decrease it. Hence, one would observe a negative cross pass-
through. This phenomenon has already featured in Higgins et al.(2005) where it was used to 
explain the post-merger price decrease by non-merging firms.47 Authors do not make a 
reference to the cross pass-through rate, but rather operate in terms of strategic relationship 







π , reaction curve ),( cppi would have a positive slope 















d 49. In other words, elasticity can 
only rise after the competitor’s price increase if the demand slope does too (all in absolute 
values). This last property might be easier to verify empirically or theoretically according to 
the demand function chosen, however it is only a necessary conditions for the elasticity to 
increase, but not a sufficient one. 
To summarize the findings from Section 3 and 4, assuming that the underlying 
assumptions are met, there are three ‘determinants’ affecting the sign of the ijm : the 

























47 Authors assume that marginal costs are constant, therefore only demand side effects were present. 
48Recall that the link between the sign of the cross pa s-through and strategic relationship was derived under the 
assumption of symmetry. Alternatively, this requirement can be substituted by the assumption of consiste t 





















∂ . The slope of the reaction curve therefore would strictly depend then on the sign of the 
cross pass-through rate  ijm . For more information on consistent conjectures see Jaffe and Weyl (2011). 
 








































d   and the following sign constraint 
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magnitude of the own pass-through of the respective competitor )( jjm , the own demand 







 and the slope of the marginal 
costs curve with respect to own production quantity.  
On one hand, it is very convenient that all the required curvatures and slopes in (4) 
should be estimated at pre-merger state of the market. If underlying assumption are met, then 
if pre-merger marginal costs are increasing (decreasing) and competitor’s’ price increase does 
not make own residual demand more (less) elastic, one can be sure that cross pass-through is 
positive (negative). On the other hand, no robust conclusion can be made if the two elements 
in question are of different signs because relative importance of each of them is case specific. 
Moreover, practical verification of the signs and magnitudes of these determinants may be as 
complex as a full merger simulation. I suggest thatese findings should be employed is the 
step of the merger assessment when the simulation framework is only being designed. 
Verifying whether the chosen demand and supply system  (before being calibrated or 
estimated) are flexible enough to allow the determinants in question to be of any sign, 
removes the ad hoc constraints on the cross pass-through pattern. If the underlying setting was 
proved to be flexible and the resulting pass-through matrix appears to contain some negative 
elements, then this knowledge can be employed in other areas of merger investigation, for 
example in the assessment of coordinated effects or market definition (see Section 2 for the 
examples).
 
However, the practical applicability of these result  may seem limited as all 
determinants were derived for symmetric industries, while the one related to the magnitude of 
the own pass-through from Weyl and Fabinger (2009), in addition, is valid only for horizontal 
demands and constant marginal costs. In the next section I empirically verify whether these 
results can be, at least to some extent, generalized to a non-symmetric case with no additional 
restrictions on demand or slope of the marginal costs curve. 
  
Essays in Competition Policy 
PhD dissertation of Aleksandra Khimich, Toulouse School of Economics 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________  
- 77 - 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
Dataset 
To verify whether the theoretical findings from the previous section would still hold 
when underlying assumptions are relaxed, I create a s t of 100,000 economies by using the 
Monte Carlo simulation tool designed in Chapter 2 of the present thesis.50 Each of generated 
economies comprises J (J=10) single product firms that compete a la Bertrand-Nash and 
produce differentiated products, as well as consumers whose preferences are generated by a 
random coefficient model. I do not modify the demand and supply systems, but unlike the 
original study, I do not impose any restriction on the cost function so that both increasing and 
decreasing marginal costs can be present within the same economy. A sampling process 
involves distributions for products’ characteristic, consumers’ preferences and firms’ costs 
elements. Distributions of certain parameters vary from one economy to another that allows 
generating highly heterogeneous economic situations. Recovering of the equilibrium 
outcomes employs the fixed-point algorithm that does not always converge. Therefore, non-
converged economies, as well as those with zero market shares and extreme elasticity values 
are removed from the sample.51 It reduces the initial sample to 52748 observations. More 
details on the simulation procedure can be found in the Chapter 2 of the present thesis.  
A great advantage of the simulation approach is that all required information concerning 
the slopes and derivatives of demand and supply functions can be easily recovered as one 
possesses the full information about economic agents. Equally important, generated sample is 
sufficiently differentiated and at the same time realistic. Tables 1-3 below illustrate this point. 
For example, first firm’s own demand elasticity varies from -26.9 to -0.05, its market share 
also has quite a wide range from almost zero to 74%(see Table 1). In fact, all the considered 
economic variables vary within quite large, but realistic intervals, while meeting the sign 





                                                          
50 I employ SAS statistical programs and routines. 
51 Precisely, I remove economies with demand elasticities lying below 1 percentile and above 99 percentile. 
Cases with zero market shares are removed to maintain the number of firms constant for comparability. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main economic parameters of the simulated economies 
(total number of observations =52748) 
 
 
While it is relatively easy to demonstrate that the cost function employed for 
simulations allows for both increasing and decreasing marginal costs, the analysis of the 
discreet choice demand system can be much more challenging, especially if one needs to 
verify such a complex property as sensitivity of own demand elasticity with respect to the 
price of competitors. The choice of a discreet choie model for the present study was 
motivated by the following consideration. As it follows from Gabaix et al. (2009), log-
curvature of distributions of preference parameters impacts the demand log-curvature, 
therefore discreet choice models can potentially generate any desirable demand shape. To 
demonstrate this, in Table 2 I provide the breakdown f the simulated economies according to 
the sign of the variables of the interest defined in the previous section, where the “elasticity 
shift” stands for the change in demand elasticity of the first firm with respect to the price of 
the second firm and “demand curvature” is defined for the first firm. Overall the number of 
observations with all desirable slopes and curvatures is sufficient to obtain robust estimations. 
 
  
                                                          
52 Discreet choice models assume the existence of the ‘outside option’ that corresponds to a situation when 
consumer decides to buy a good outside of the considered basket of J goods or does not buy at all. Market shares 
are, therefore, calculated with respect to a market siz  that comprises this ‘outside option’. 
Parameters Mean Variance Min Max 
Own price demand elasticity, 11ε  -11.08 5.42 -27.00 -1.00 
Cross price demand elasticity, 12ε  0.32 0.64 0.00 25.09 
Aggregate demand elasticity -0.75 1.17 -8.79 -0.00 
Own pass-through,
11m  1.04 0.25 0.01 3.97 
Cross pass-through, 
12m  0.00 0.02 -0.73 0.77 
Markup ( %), 1st firm 12.67 10.58 0.01 98.43 
Market share (%),1st firm52 2.68 5.69 0.02 74.72 
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Table 2: Breakdown of simulated economies according to selected propertis 























The created dataset was then employed to estimate the significance of each of the three 
selected determinants of the sign of the cross pass-through. But before proceeding with a 
formal empirical estimation results, it could be usef l to take a look at the tabulation of the 
cases from the sample according to the state of selected determinants and the sign of the cross 
pass-through. Table 3 below, that provides the requi d breakdown, offers some interesting 
observations. A simple overview suggests that nor the magnitude of the own pass-through 
neither the ‘elasticity shift’ factor have any significant impact on the sign of the cross pass-
through – number of cases between with positive and negative cross pass-through is similar 
regardless whether the determinant in question is favoring this sign or not. In turn, marginal 
costs’ slope has quite a clear effect – negative cross pass- through is mostly recorded when 
marginal costs are decreasing.  
Table 3: Tabulation of the sample according to selected properties 




Elasticity shift (abs.) Marginal costs 
>1 <1 Decreasing Increasing Decreasing Increasing 
012 >m  27.0% 29.6% 49.3% 7.2% 6.3% 50.3% 
012 <m  21.3% 22.1% 35.6% 7.9% 40.6% 2.8% 
 
                                                          
53 A threshold of “1” arises naturally from previous theoretical results. See, for instance, Weyl and Fabinger 
(2009). 
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However, this kind of analysis is not enough for a definitive conclusion as all of the 
determinants contribute simultaneously and may do so in opposite directions. Therefore, 
below I perform an assessment of the relevant importance of each of the determinants in a 
more comprehensive way. 
 
Estimation of the probit model  
Put it in a nut shell, what needs to be tested is whether the probability of facing a 
negative (positive) cross pass-through ijm is higher when i) the own pass-through of the 
relevant competitor )( jjm is above (below) one, and/or ii) own demand becomes ore (less) 
elastic with competitor’s price increase, and/or iii) own marginal costs are decreasing 
(increasing) in quantity. Ideally, the chosen econometric tool should be able to predict the 
probability of having a negative (positive) cross pass-through when all of the three conditions, 
or at least some of them, are satisfied.  
The most convenient model that fits these requirements is a Probit regression in the 
following specification:54 
 
)()|0_(Pr βijijij XXMSob ′Φ==       (5) 
 
where ijMS_  is a binary variable that takes value 0 whenever 0≤ijm ,and 1 otherwise and 
}_,_,_,1{ iijjjij MCSESSMSX = is a vector of explanatory variables.
55
jjMS_ takes value 1 








zero otherwise. Variable iMCS_  takes value 1 when marginal costs )( ii dmc are decreasing 
and zero otherwise. ijX also includes a dummy variable ‘1’ to account for the intercept. 
Finally, )(⋅Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the stand rd normal distribution. 
),,,( 3210 βββββ = is therefore a vector of coefficients to be estimated by a maximum 
likelihood method. 321 ,, βββ are expected to be positive, while the intercept coefficient 0β  
has no particular sign constraints. 
                                                          
54  A Logit regression that also fits model requirements would generally provide similar results. 
55 Distributions of the selected variables were found to be independent. Respective tables can be provided upon 
request. 
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As Section 2 motivates, various “counterintuitive” or “unexpected” effects in mergers 
and merger evaluations appear mostly in the presenc of negative cross pass-through rates. 
Therefore, the probit model was set to estimate the probability of having a negative cross 
pass-through, and the further analysis will have it in focus as well. 
Having the simulated sample on hand, it is now possible to proceed with estimation of 
the parameters of interest. Without loss of generality I estimate the probit model for the 12m  
only. Results are provided in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of the cross pass-through sign  






Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -2.0454 0.0195 11028.8 <.0001 
22_ MS  0.00341 0.016 0.0454 0.8312 
12_ ESS  1.2438 0.0251 2458.15 <.0001 
1_ MCS  2.9466 0.02 21661.5 <.0001 
Testing Global Null 




Because all explanatory variables are binary, one ca not easily interpret the estimates of 
the coefficients from Table 3. However, their significance and sign remain extremely 
informative. For example, the coefficient tied with 22_MS is not significant, therefore having 
an own pass-through of the competitor above one does n t affect the firm’s probability of 
facing a negative cross pass-through. The reason is, mo t probably, a very restrictive set of 
assumptions under which this determinant was developed, including symmetry, horizontal 
demand and constant marginal costs (see Weyl and Fabinger (2009)). 
On the other hand, the theoretical intuition for the other two determinants is supported- 
estimated parameters that are tied to the elasticity and slope of the marginal costs curve are 
significant and have the expected signs. In Section 4 it was established that if these two 
determinants both favor a certain cross pass-throug si n, then, under symmetry, the sign 
prediction is always accurate. Our sample is not limited to only symmetric economies; 
nevertheless, it also demonstrates a very high probability of correct predictions. For example, 
the probability of facing a negative cross pass-through when both determinants are favorable  
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(e.g. 1__ 112 == MCSESS  ) is at least 97.6% (see the confidence interval limits in the first 
line of Table 5). 
Table 5: Predicted probabilities of having a negative cross pass-through for given values 
of explanatory variables  




St. error. Confidence limits 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
1__ 112 == MCSESS   0.978 0.001 0.976 0.981 5987.64 <.0001 
1_ 12 =ESS and 0_ 1=MCS  0.206 0.005 0.196 0.216 5283.67 <.0001 
0_ 12 =ESS and 1_ 1=MCS  0.796 0.003 0.790 0.802 1390.44 <.0001 
But what if the determinants in question drive the sign of the cross pass-through in 
opposite directions? To answer this question it might be useful to establish the relative 
importance of these two variables. To do so, I calcul te the probabilities of having a negative 
cross pass-through when MCSESS __ 12 ≠ . The last two lines in Table 5 provide the sought-
for estimations. 
When only marginal costs slope is favoring the negative cross pass-through (i.e. 
0_ 12 =ESS and 1_ 1=MCS ) then the probability that the first firm is actually facing it is at 
least 79% (left boundary of the confidence interval). On the other hand, the favoring demand 
property only generates negative cross pass-through with a probability of maximum 21.6% 
(upper boundary of the corresponding confidence intrval).  
It is intuitive to expect that the revealed dominance of the marginal costs in driving the 
sign of the cross pass-through is not a result of a general rule, but rather a specific feature of 
the simulated sample. To demonstrate this, probit model estimations were performed on a 
different sample of economies that is different from the present sample only in a way the 
marginal costs are generated. Precisely, new sample is g nerated with a more flat function of 
marginal costs.56 All the conclusions made for the original sample remain valid, except that 
the demand side effects became at least as important as marginal costs in defining the sign of 
the cross pass-through (see Table 6). 
                                                          
56 Parameter γ that is responsible for the slope of the marginal costs curve was set to 0.0002, instead of 0.002. 
See Chapter 2 of the present thesis for more details on the cost function design and the simulation procedure. 
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Table 6: Predicted probabilities of having a negative cross pass-through for given values 
of explanatory variables  




St. error. Confidence limits 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
1_ 12 =ESS and 1_ 1=MCS  0.9971 0.0017 0.9914 0.9991 206.7356 <.0001 
1_ 12 =ESS and 0_ 1=MCS  0.5785 0.0419 0.4951 0.6584 3.4086 0.003 
0_ 12 =ESS and 1_ 1=MCS  0.5566 0.0265 0.5043 0.608 4.4968 <.0001 
Despite the fact that this exercise witnesses for a certain lack of robustness, results in 
Table 5 remain extremely important as they illustrate that the assumption of constant marginal 
costs (that is commonly adopted in merger simulations) may significantly limit the cross pass-
through pattern. As was motivated in Section 2, the latter would, in turn, narrow down the 
possible range for predicted post-merger price changes. It may result, for example, in the 
exclusion of the possibility of a price decrease either by a merging firm or by non-merging 
ones, and therefore to render a potentially welfare improving merger as detrimental. 
Similar analysis was performed for the samples with d fferent number of firms (J=3 and 
J=20), as well as with a logit specification of the models instead of the probit. In all cases 
estimations provided similar results and for this reason will be not presented here. 
6. Conclusions 
As demonstrated in Jaffe and Weyl (2009) and Froeb et al. (2005), the pass-through 
matrix plays an important role in defining the pricing effects of horizontal mergers. In contrast 
with existing literature that focuses mostly on the role of the own pass-through rate, the 
present study demonstrates that role of the cross pa -through can as well be significant. The 
ignorance of its presence, and particularly of its sign, can lead to various counterintuitive 
effects and misleading conclusions in merger investigations. Almost all stages of the process 
are subject to risk, including the market definition procedure and assessment of unilateral and 
coordinated effects. The issue touches upon not only cross pass-through rates of merging 
entities but also non-merging ones, as their price reactions arise only from the cross pass-
through effects. These firms can find it profitable to decrease prices post-merger and, by 
doing so, render the merger socially beneficial. 
Existing literature that studies the properties of the pass-through focuses mainly on the 
own pass-through rate and often limits the discussion to a very particular setting that makes 
Essays in Competition Policy 
PhD dissertation of Aleksandra Khimich, Toulouse School of Economics 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________  
- 84 - 
 
the results inapplicable in majority of horizontal merger cases. In contrast, the present study 
examines the properties of the whole pass-through matrix, as well as determinants of the sign 
and magnitude of the cross pass-through rate. It is done for a very general framework that is 
convenient for merger simulations, although restricted to a Bertrand-Nash competition. 
Among the most striking observations, the present study finds that: 
i) cross pass-through effect cannot dominate the own pass-through one and its’ relative 
significance decreases with a higher number of firms, all other parameters being equal. 
Nevertheless, as Section 2 illustrates, this does nt mean that the cross pass-through 
effect can be neglected in merger investigations, especially when it is negative;  
ii)  not only demand function shape, but also the slope of marginal costs curve matters for 
the sign of the cross pass-through. Therefore, the usually adapted assumption of 
constant marginal costs may significantly limit or even distort the possible outcomes 
of merger simulations, e.g. render a potentially welfar  improving merger as a priori 
detrimental. 
Together with merger assessment, derived results could be relevant as well for the other 
domains of industrial economics, for example, cartel investigations. As the link between 
strategic relationship and the sign of the cross pass-through rate was revealed, we can apply 
the results from the study of Potters and Suetens (2006), mentioned in Section 2. Their 
experimental study finds that market agents have higher incentives for collusion when prices 
are strategic complements (compared to strategic substit tes). Furthermore, if merger with no 
cost efficiencies can improve consumers’ welfare thanks to negative cross pass-through 
effects, then a hard-core cartel could do so too. This suggests that the widespread opinion that 
all hard core cartels are per se harmful probably needs to be reconsidered. 
An analysis of the pass-through matrix in a more complex environment, such as multi-
product ownership, complementary products, Cournot competition, capacity constraints, 
vertical interactions, etc. is appealing and can be envisioned in the future. The simulation tool 
developed in Chapter 2 and employed in the present study is flexible enough to account for all 
mentioned configurations and provides a great way to test any kind of theoretical results or 
intuitions as practically all information about economic agents is available.  
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Appendix A - Major ‘hard core’ cartels prosecuted in selected developing 
countries (1995-2013) 
Argentina Chile (cont.) 
Portland cement 1981-1999 Vehicles and spare parts  
11 Aug’06 (bid 
rigging) 
Medical gases n/a-1997 Publishing services Mar’08-Apr’08 
Healthcare services n/a Pharmaceutical (distribution) Dec’07-Apr’08 
Liquid petroleum gas (S.C. 
Bariloche) Jan'98-Dec'98 Public transportation Oct’06-Nov’07 
Sand (Parana city) Jun'99-Jul'01 Radio transmission 2007 
Liquid oxygen Jan'97-Dec'01 Tourism (agent services) 2008 
Cable TV (Santa Fe city) Oct'97-Dec'01 Public transportation (maritime) 2009 
Cable TV service (football 
transmissions) Jan'96-Dec'98 Public transportation (bus) Feb’07-Mar’09 
Brazil Flat Panel TV  n/a 
Civil airlines Jan’99-Mar’03 Colombia 
Retail fuel dealers (Goiania) Apr’99-May’02 Cement Feb’06-Jan'10 
Retail fuel dealers 
(Florianopolis ) 1999-2002 Mobile phone services Apr’99-Aug’07 
Retail fuel dealers ( Belo 
Horizonte) 1999-2002 Green onions Feb"07-Jan'09 
Retail fuel dealers (Recife) Apr’99-Feb’02 Pasteurized milk Jan’97-n/a 
Generic drugs Jul’99-Oct’99 Green paddy rice Jan'04-Nov'06 
Maritime hose  Jun’99-May’07 Chocolate and cocoa products Oct’06-Oct'09 
Crushed rocks Dec’99-Jun’03 Private security  servic s Feb'11-Sep'12 
Security guard services 1990-2003 
Services of grade systematization 
(Bogotá District schools) Jun'08-Dec'09 
Hermetic compressors 2001-2009 Milk processing n/a-2008 
Industrial gas 1998-Mar’04 Health services Mar/09-Nov'11 
Air cargo Jul’03-Jul’05 Oxygen supply May'05-Mar'11 
Transportation Oct’97-Jan’01 Road paving Aug'10-Jan'12 
Steel bars 1998-Nov’99 Sugar cane remuneration rates Feb'10-Aug'11 
Construction materials  (sand) 1998-Apr’03 
Cars’ techno-mechanical and gas 
review Mar'10-Oct'11 
Steel 1994-Dec’99 
Cars’ techno-mechanical and gas 
review Mar'10-Dec'11 
Blood products Jan’03-Dec’03 Feed ration service for prisons May'11-Sept'12 
Toy manufacturers (imports 
from China) 2006-2009 
Cars’ techno-mechanical and gas 
review Apr'10-Mar'12 
Chile TV advertising market Apr'10-Apr'11 
Petroleum products Feb’01-Sep’02 Egypt 
Medical gases (oxygen) 2001-2004 
Construction (Egypt Wastewater 
Plant)  Jun'88-Sept'96 
Medical insurance plans  2002-2004 Cement Jan'03-Dec'06 
Medical  services May’05-May’06 El Salvador 
Construction materials 
(asphalt)  
20 Oct’06 (bid 
rigging) Petroleum products n/a-2007 
Public transportation (bus) 2006 Indonesia 
Public transportation (bus) Nov’07-May’08 Mobile phone services 
Mar’03-
Nov’05 
Petroleum products Mar’08-Dec’08 SMS Jan’04-Apr’08 
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Indonesia (cont.) South Korea (cont.) 
School books Jan’99- Dec’00 Elevators and escalators Apr’96-Apr’06 
Cement n/a-Dec’09 Toilet roll manufacturing Mar’97-Jan’98 
Airlines Jan’06-Dec’09 Coffee Jul’97-Jan’98 
Pharmaceuticals n/a Kenya 
Poultry (day old chicken) Jan’00-Dec’00 Coffee producers n/a 
Sea cargo ( Jakarta-Pontianak) Jun’02-Oct’03 Fertilizers I n/a-2003 
Sea cargo ( Surabaya-
Makassar) Jan’03-Sep’03 Beer (production) n/a-2004 
Public transportation (city 
bus) Sep’01-Oct’03 Soft drinks  n/a-2004 
Salt Trade ( North Sumatra) Jan’05-Dec’05 Transportation n/a 
Sea Cargo (Sorong Seaport) Mar’00-Nov’08 Mechanical engineers services n/a 
Kazakhstan Insurance (transportation sector) n/a-2002 
Petroleum products (brokers) 2002-2005 Petroleum (retail) n/a-2004 
South Korea Fertilizers II n/a-2011 
Batteries manufacturing (auto) Jun’03-Sep’04 Tea growe s n/a-2004 
Beer Feb’98-May’99 Sugar n/a-2004 
Cement Jan’02-Mar’03 
Port Customs Department 
auctions n/a 
Construction machinery 
(excavators) May’01-Nov’04 Malawi 
Forklifts manufacturing Dec’99-Nov’04 Cotton farmers n/a 
Petroleum products (military, 
wholesale) 1998-2000 Tea growers n/a 
Telecom services (local, land 
line) Jun’03-May’05 Tobacco growers n/a 
Telecom services (long-
distance, land line) Jun’03-May’05 Bakeries n/a 
Telecom services 
(international, landline) Jun’03-May’05 Beer n/a 
Broadband Internet service Jun’03-May’05 Petroleum sector n/a 
Detergent manufacturing 1998-2006 Mauritius 
Telecommunications (mobile 
services) I  Jun’04-May’06 Travel agency 2010 
Telecommunications (mobile 
services) II Jan’00-Jul’06 Mexico 
Gasoline and diesel (refining) Apr’04-Jun’04 Gas (liquid propane) Jan'96-Feb'96 
Industrial motors 1998-2006 Chemicals (film development) Jan'98-Dec'00 
Polyethylene (low density) Apr’94-Apr’05 Poultry Mar'10-Mar'10 
Polypropylene (high density 
polyethylene) Apr’94-Apr’05 Boiled corn and corn tortillas Mar'11-Jul'12 
Movie tickets Mar’07-Jul’07 Corn mass and tortillas May'10-Aug'12 
Trunked radio system devices Dec’03-Feb’06 Transportati n (touristic sector) Jul'09-Mar'12 
Petrochemicals Sep’00-Jun’05 Anesthesiology (servics) May'03-May'09 
Copy paper imports Jan’01-Feb’04 Auto transportation (cargo) I Jan'10-Sep'11 
Soft drink bottling Feb’08-Feb’09 Maritime public transportation Jun'08-Jun'12 
Gas (LPG) Jan’03-Dec’09 Auto transportation (cargo) II Sept'08-Jun'10 
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Mexico (cont.) Russia (cont.) 
Healthcare (medical drugs) 2003-2005 
Laptop computer operating 
systems n/a 
Consulting services (real 
estate) Jul'03-Apr'09 
Fuel (petroleum, Krasnodarki 
krai) Jan'05-Jul'05 
Restricted TV signal Oct'02-Dec'08 
Fuel (petroleum,  Rostov-on-
Don) n/a-2005 
Food vouchers Aug'05-Sept'05 
Airlines (flights between 
Nizhnevartovsk and Moscow) n/a-Dec'05 
Consulting services (real 
estate) II May'03-Jul'09 
Railway transportation 
(Kemerovo) Oct'11-Dec'12 
Railway transportation (cargo) Nov'05-Jun'09 Soda cartel 2005-2012 
Cable and cable products Feb'06-Mar'07 Polyvinylchloride cartel  2005-2009 
Pakistan Pharmaceutical cartel  2008-2009 
Bank interest rates Nov/07-Apr’08 Fish cartel (Norway) Aug'11-Dec'12 
Cement Mar’08-Aug’09 Pollock cartel  Apr'06-Dec'12 
Gas (LPG) n/a-2009 Fish cartel (Vietnam) Jun'08-Sept'13 
Jute mills 2003-Jan'11 Salt cartel  May'10-May'13 
High and low tension pre-
stressed concrete poles Aug'09-May'11 Sausage cartel  Jun'09-Dec'09 
Poultry and egg industry 2007-Aug'10 Military uniform supply  2010-Jun'12 
Newspapers Apr'08-Apr'09 South Africa 
Vessels handling(ships) 2001-Mar'11 Fertilizers (phosphoric acid) Jan’03-Dec’07 
Port construction May'09-Jul'10 Airlines  (fuel surcharge) 
May’04-
Mar'05 
Ghee and cooking oil Dec'08-Jun'11 
Airlines (So. Africa-Frankfurt 
routes) Jan’99-Dec’02 
Accounting services Apr'07-Jan'13 Milk (farm and retail) n/a-Jul’06 
LDI operators Sep'11-Apr'13 Bread and flour 1994-2007 




Banking services (1-Link 
Guarantee Ltd) Sep'11-Jun'12 Tire manufacturing 1998-2007 
Peru Metal (scrap) Jan’98-Jul’07 
Urban public transportation 1 Aug'08-Oct'08 Steel (flat) 1999-Jun’08 
Urban public transportation 2 Aug'08-Oct'08 Cement I 1996-2009 
Public notaries n/a Plastic pipes 1998-2009 
Dock work Sep'08-May'09 
Concrete, precast pipes, culverts, 
manholes, & sleepers 1973-2007 
Insurance 1 Dec'01-Apr'02 Fishing n/a-2009 
Insurance 2 Oct'00-Jan'03 Cement II Jan'04-Jun'09 
Poultry May'95-Jul'96 Construction n/a-2009 
Wheat flour Mar'95-Jul'95 Steel distribution n/a-2008 
Heaters/boilers etc. 
manufacturing Oct'95-Mar'96 Steel (re-bars, rods & sections) n/a-2008 
Oxygen distribution 
(healthcare) Jan'99-Jun'04 Steel (wire, wire products) 2001-2008 
Freight transport Nov'04-May'09 Crushed rock n/a-2008 
Russia Bricks n/a-2008 
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South Africa (cont.) Turkey (cont.) 
Steel (mining roof bolts) 2002-2009 Accumulators n/a 
Flour milling 2009-Mar’10 Ukraine 
Bitumen 2000-2009 
Acquisition of raw timber 
auctions (furniture) 2011 
Poultry 2005-2009 Sale of poultry meat n/a 
Polypropylene plastic 1994-2009 Sale of sugar n/a 
Sugar 2000-n/a Sale of alcohol n/a 
Taxi n/a Sale of buckwheat n/a 
Auto dealers 2005-n/a Individual insurance markets 2003 
Healthcare fees 2002-2007 
Market of services on sale of 
arrested property state 2004 
Pharmaceuticals n/a-2002 Zambia 
Motor vehicle 
manufacturers/importers n/a-2006 
Pipes, culverts, manholes and 
pre-stressed concrete sleepers. n/a 
Freight forwarding n/a-2007 Oil marketing 2001-2002 
Energy/switchgear n/a-2008 Fertilizer 2007-2013 
Fertilizer (nitrogen) 2004-2006 
Grain procurement and 
marketing (maize-meal) Mar'04-Jun'04 
Steel (reinforcing mesh) 2001-2008 Public transport n/a 
Soda ashes (imports) 1999-2008 Poultry 1998-1999 
Tanzania Panel Beating Services Sep'11-Dec'11 
Beer n/a Zimbabwe 
Pipes, culverts, manholes and 
pre-stressed concrete sleepers n/a-2009 Bakeries n/a 
Petroleum sector n/a-2000   
Turkey   
Daily newspapers n/a   
Traffic lights n/a   
Public transportation (buses) n/a   
Poultry  n/a   
Bakeries n/a   
Beer n/a   
Soft drink n/a   
Maritime transport service n/a-2004   
Mechanical engineers n/a   
Insurance n/a-2003   
Telecommunications n/a-2002   
Architects' and Engineers' 
services n/a-2002   
Yeast n/a   
Cement n/a   
Cement (Aegean region ) 2002-2004   
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Appendix B - Questionnaire 
FIRST PART. General questions 
1) Annual budget of the competition policy enforcement u it during the period 1995-
201357 (in local currency); 
SECOND PART. Identification of cartels. 
2) Please, provide a list of major “hard core” cartels for the period 1995-2013; 
3) For each identified cartel, provide information on:
a. Relevant market (product, geography, etc); 
b. Names of cartel members; 
c. Period of existence of the cartel (beginning/termination); 
d. Date of discovery of the cartel; 
e. Date of entry of each company in the cartel coalition, f available; 
f. Fines applied, if any (in local currency); 
g. Price overcharge by cartel members, if available (percentage with respect to 
the cartel price or money terms in local currency) 
THIRD PART. Economic data on each cartel identified in the second section of the 
questionnaire.  
1) At least for one period (month/year) of cartel existence indicate the market 
share/volume sold and price (in local currency) of the product/ products for each 
colluding company; 
2) If possible, give an estimation of the average margin for the cartel = (price-marginal 
costs)/price; 
3) Please, provide, whether available, the estimate of the volume of the relevant market 
(in local currency), if not: 
4) According to the good that is analyzed, please provide an estimation of the total 
market share of the non-cartel members on the relativ  market; 
                                                          
57
Time period is subject to change depending on the dat  when the competition authority started to be functioning. 
Appendix C - Example of the calibration and estimation procedure
Four national airlines, namely Varig, TAM, Transbrasil and VASP, were convicted in 
collusive price-fixing behavior on the civil air transportation market between Rio de Janeiro 
(airport Santos Dumont) and San Paolo (airport Congonhas) during the year of 1999. We do 
not go into details concerning the evidence that the Brazilian competition authority employed 
to convict a cartel but will rather focus on the estimation of the
caused by this anticompetitive practice.
Table C-1 below provides the 
prices charged by cartel members, as well
of tickets sold). These are the minimal 








We recognize that it would be more correct to separate leisure and business segments of 
the demand, which would obvi
however available data did not permit us to do so. Given that the share of business segment on 
the relevant market reaches up to
correspond mostly to this demand category.
As the developed methodolog
parameters we need to set the share of the outside alternative (
exogenously. We use additional data on the case to set the admissible ranges for these 
parameters. 
                                                          
58Real – Brazilian national currency
 economic 
 
collected data regarding the observed one
 as their observed market shares (
data that are sufficient to implement 
. 
-1: Input data (as of July 1999) 
Observed market 
share 
Average price of a one 





inistrativo de Defesa Econômica (the competiton
ously have different sensitivities to price
 70%, we believe that recovered market parameters will 
 
y implies, to perform calibration of supply and demand 
) and average cartel margin 
 
 
harm to consumers 
-way ticket 
based on number 
our methodology 
 
 authority of Brazil) 
 (parameterα ), 
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Considered airports are the only ones situated close t  the city centers of Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paulo, which makes them especially relevant for business passengers. In addition, 
there are no convenient substitutes, such as sufficiently fast trains or buses. Airlines that 
formed the cartel perform nearly 100% of the flights between the mentioned airports. 
Therefore, one can assume that share of the outside alternative for the business segment 
cannot be too big. However, presence of the leisure egment and other airports serving the 
same origin and destination markets suggests that0s  cannot be too low either. We arbitrary 
choose the admissible range for the share of the outside option as ∈0 [10%,50%]. 
As for the second exogenous parameter – average cartel margin, we first make use of 
the results of Betancor and Nombela (2001), who demonstrate that marginal costs of 
American and European airlines are at least equal and at most twice higher than their average 
costs. We assume further that Brazilian airlines’ cost structure is not much different from that 
in Europe and the U.S. Having extracted average costs from the annual reports of the 
colluding companies, we get 40% as a maximal value for the average margin (when marginal 
costs are equal to average costs). Given that airlines’ activities include also those non-
cartelized, we assume that possible margin on the cart lized market could potentially have an 
upper bound above 40%.  After a final check with sign constraints for marginal costs and 
price sensitivity parameter α , we define a permitted range for the average cartel margin as 
[10%, 45%]. 
When one changes level of external parameters, then calibrated market parameters also 
change. Along with the minimal and maximal bounds, considering some intermediary values 
might be also reasonable if an analyst has an idea about the most probable values of 
exogenous parameters inside the chosen interval. Therefore, in Table C-2 we provide 
calibrated price sensitivityα  depending on the average cartel margin and share of the outside 
option: for minimal, maximal and some intermediary values of external parameters. These 
dependencies are monotonic. We also report corresponding calibrated values of Jjj ,1, =δ in 
Table C-3. 
  
Essays in Competition Policy 
PhD thesis of Khimich Aleksandra, Toulouse School of Economics 
 
- 97 - 
 
 
Table C-2: Calibrated price sensitivity parameter (α ) 
 Average cartel margin 


















10% 0.80 0.40 0.23 0.18 
20% 0.40 0.20 0.11 0.09 
35% 0.23 0.11 0.07 0.05 
50% 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.04 
Source: Simulations 
Table C-3: Calibrated parameters of differentiation ( jδ ) 
 Average cartel margin/ 0s  
Airline 10%/10%  45%/10% 10%/50% 45%/50% 
VARIG 105.22 24.42 20.02 3.86 
TAM 101.66 23.62 19.19 3.58 
Transbrasil 85.30 18.54 14.43 1.08 
VASP 86.06 18.56 14.44 0.94 
Source: Simulations 
We observe that calibrated parameter α and Jjj ,1, =δ decrease when the share of the 
outside option increases, margins being fixed. This dependence follows directly from 
equations C-1 and C-4 and can be explained as following.  Lower α  indicates that 
preferences of consumers are mostly driven by the quality rather than prices. Lower jδ , 
therefore, results in a higher number of consumers who preferred the outside option as its’ 
utility is normalized and remains fixed. α also decreases with higher cartel’s margin - when 
consumers are less sensitive to the price, cartel members have more incentives to charge a 
higher price. 
For the set of calibrated market parameters we further perform the simulation of the 
counterfactual (competitive) state.59 Tables C-4 and C-5 below report the average for the 
cartel price overcharge rates (formula (8)), and consumers’ welfare losses (formula (10)) 
estimated for a given combination of values of exogenous parameters. 
                                                          
59We solve the system of non-linear equations implied by proposed methodology with the use of SAS routines 
and procedures. 
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Table C-4: Estimated price overcharge rate (average for the cartel) 
 Average cartel margin 


















10% 7.3% 14.7% 26.2% 33.9% 
20% 4.5% 9.2% 13.6% 21.8% 
35% 4.8% 8.7% 18.2% 20.8% 
50% 3.2% 6.5% 14.2% 18.9% 
Source: Simulations 
Table C-5: Estimated consumers’ welfare losses, % 
 Average cartel margin 


















10% 78.6% 78.6% 78.6% 78.6% 
20% 66.1% 66.1% 65.8% 66.2% 
35% 50.4% 48.0% 52.8% 49.5% 
50% 35.0% 35.2% 41.2% 42.2% 
Source: Simulations 
Variations of the obtained estimations of price overcharges and welfare losses according 
to the level of external parameters are intuitive. On one hand, when cartel margin is being 
fixed, a high share of the outside option informs the analyst about a high elasticity of demand. 
In these conditions, the ability of colluding firms’ to increase their prices is very limited. 
Accordingly, welfare losses are also les significant. On another hand, keeping the share of the 
outside option fixed, higher desired cartel margin naturally transforms into a higher price 
increase. Though, no definite conclusion can be made concerning the relative change in 
consumers’ welfare.60 
We acknowledge that variations of the estimates in Table C-4 and C-5 are quite large. 
Price overcharge varies from 3.2% to 33.9%, while th  welfare losses estimates range from 
42.2% to 78.6%. A greater precision can be gained provided that more precise inputs are at 
hands.  
                                                          
60Increase in cartel’s margin decreases calibrated values of marginal costs (cartel prices are given), ad lso 
decreases calibrated price sensitivity α  (see equation (3)). Left-hand side of equation (1) remains constant, 
therefore, to compensate the decrease in α , jδ  should decrease too. In competitive state we cannot predict 
whether )(
c
jj pαδ − will increase or decrease for every product, because ll three parameters have lower values. 
Equation (1) indicates that if market shares in competitive state will be relatively higher with respect to the share 
of the outside option, then welfare level will be also higher, and vice versa.  
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Appendix D - The economic model and the simulation process 
In Appendix D we provide a description of the methodol gy employed to create the two 
samples of simulated economies well as their descriptive statistics. 
Assumptions 
We build mostly on specification as in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (hereafter 
BLP) with some deviations. This setup is very general and entails mild assumptions.  
Each economy comprises consumers whose preferences are generated by a random 
utility model and an oligopoly where firms compete a la Bertrand-Nash. 
Precisely, we consider J single-product firms that sell differentiated goods and compete 
in prices. It is a static game in which firms replay after the merger of the first two of them. 
The quality of each product is drawn exogenously and remains the same after the merger (i.e., 
there is no product repositioning). These assumptions are not being modified throughout the 
paper. On the demand side we consider a set of N customers buying at most one unit of one 
product. Preferences are represented by a random utility model where product j provides the 
following level of utility to consumer n: 




( 222111      (D1) 
The consumer has also the outside option of not buying any product. In this case she 
receives the following level of utility 
0000
~
nnn xxU ε++=          (D2) 
Quality of each product is described by two variables jx1 and Jjx j ,1,2 = . Values of 
these attributes for each product are drawn from continuous and discreet distributions 
correspondingly, such that )(~ 11 continuousFx xj and JjdiscreteFx xj ,1),(~ 22 = . As for the 
outside option, common quality characteristic is constant and denoted as0x . Besides, every 
consumer extracts idiosyncratic utility 0
~
nx  associated with outside option. Having both 
continuous and discreet quality attributes gives more generality to the model and allows for a 
wider range of preferences that cannot be captured otherwise. 
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In the utility function, 21,ββ andα are drawn from βF and αF respectively, and are 
common to all products and to all consumers. Idiosyncratic tastes nn 21
~
,
~ ββ , nα~  and 0
~
nx are 




Fnn , xn Fx ~0 ~
~ and NnFn ,1,~
~
~ =∀αα . Coefficients
)
~
( 11 nββ + and )
~
( 22 nββ + thus reflect consumers’ preferences towards the quality of products, 
while )~( 11 nαα + corresponds to sensitivity to pricejp . Finally, njε is an idiosyncratic term 
related to both product and individual, and drawn from an extreme value distribution denoted 
by εF . 
For a given vector of prices, the true demand for god j is simply the number of 
customers that choose this product, i.e. whose utility function is such that jnnj UU ′> for 
all ′ ≠ . 
On the supply side, we assume that the per unit production cost of product j is equal to  
)exp( 2211 jjjjj qxxc ⋅+++= γωγγ        (D3) 
where jq is the quantity sold of product j, jω  is a firm-specific cost component, 1γ , 2γ
and γ  are common to all firms. These parameters are drawn once for all firms in a given 
economy from
2,1γF , γF and ωF  respectively. 
Note that, for the purpose of the exercise, model does not contain any elements 
unobserved to the analyst.  
Sampling procedure 
We generate 100,000 economies using a sampling process involving distributions for 
the products’ characteristics, the consumers’ preferences and the firms’ cost structure.61 All 
distributions F introduced above are functions of meta parameters that are fixed to values that 
allow us generate highly heterogeneous economic situations.  
An economy is generated along the following steps:  
- The nature draws values for 21021 ,,,,, γγαββ x and γ ; 
                                                          
61We use SAS routines and functions. 
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- The nature draws independently J product qualities from xx FF 21 ,  and J associated 
costs from ωF and 2,1, γγ FF . Firms observe the whole set of qualities and costs; 






and njε for all j. Thus, conditionally to prices they can only compute expected market 
shares, given that they know distributions of idiosyncratic tastes. Following BLP, the 

































=  (D4) 
- The Nash equilibrium is solved for prices; 
- The nature draws independently the idiosyncratic tastes for N individuals. Then 
consumers observe qualities and prices and eventually m ke their choice.  
Basic setting includes functional form of utility and marginal costs, as presented above, 
as well as number of firms and consumers, and distributions of the model primitives. Table D-
1 below provides the lists of parameters for the sampling process. 
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Table D-1: Basic setting for simulations 
 
Parameter Basic setting 
J Number of products J is fixed to 9 for all economies 
F Number of firms F is fixed to 9 for all economies 
N Number of consumers is set to 10,000, fixed for all economies 
α  α is constant in each given economy, but varies across economies with uniform 
distribution ]15,0[U  
nα~  For a given economy nα
~ varies among consumers with exponential distribution 
ασ/1E . Parameter ασ  is distributed uniformly ]7,0[U  among economies 
β  β is fixed in each given economy, but varies across economies with uniform 




~ ββ  For a given economy nn 21
~
,





N  respectively. Parameters
1βσ and 2βσ vary across economies 
with uniform distribution ]5,0[U  
0, nnj εε  njε and 0nε  are both drawn from extreme value distribution ][ λF , where scale 
parameter λ is equal to 0.5 
jx1  For each economy )exp(1 jjx ξτ ⋅= ,where 3.0=τ  and jξ are distributed normally 
with ]5,2[N  
jx2  For each economy )0(2 >= jj Ix η ,where jη  are distributed normally with ]1,0[N  
0x  For a given economy, 0x is drawn from a ]5,0[N  
0
~
nx  For a given economy 0
~
nx varies among consumers with normal distribution
],0[ x
N σ . Values of xσ for different economies are drawn from uniform 
distribution ]3,0[U . 
jω  For each economyjω  is distributed normally with ]05.0,0[N .  
1γ , 2γ  Both 1γ  and 2γ are fixed for each given economy, but vary across economies 
with the same uniform distribution ]1,0[U  
γ  γ is fixed for each given economy and common for all firms. In present paper γ  
is set to zero as we assume that marginal costs are constant. 
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For simplicity, we assume per unit production costs to be constant ( 0=γ ) and thus 
equal to marginal costs. The number of firms is set to 9 to obtain post-merger HHI levels both 
below and above the current US guidelines’ thresholds. 
The number of consumers is large enough (N=10,000) in order that expected market 
shares computed by firms converge to the true ones. As the fixed-point algorithm to solve for 
the equilibrium does not always converge, we cannot consider the corresponding cases which 
amount to 16% of the initial sample. In addition, the cases where at least one pre-merger 
market share is equal to zero and those where equilibri m second order conditions were not 
satisfied are also removed which reduces the size of the sample by another 41%.
62
 Moreover, 
we delete economies displaying outliers, i.e. economies with extreme values of elasticities. 
Precisely, we only qualify economies for which the own and cross price elasticities of 
merging products do not fall below the 1stpercentile and above the 99thpercentile of the 
original distributions of these variables. After we simulate a merger in each of economies 
from the sample, we also remove cases with non-convergence of post-merger equilibrium that 
leaves us with 41,851 observations. 
Because, unlike the UPP index, the HHI does not have an inherent capacity to take into 
account possible cost efficiencies that might occur post-merger, we find it reasonable to 
simulate two sets of economies where the only difference between them is the level of post-
merger cost efficiencies. All pre-merger characteris ics are thus common for both sets.  
In Table D-2 below we provide descriptive statistic of the main economic variables of 
generated economies for both cleaned samples after removing non converging cases, zero 
market shares and after truncation of the elasticities distributions’ tails. All market shares, 
markups and elasticities in the table correspond to the pre-merger state. 
  
                                                          
62Note that zero market share is not a problem per se. However it amounts to change the number of active firms 
on the market, whereas we want to keep this parameter fixed for a given sample of economies. 
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Table D-2: Descriptive statistics of main economic parameters: 
(cleaned samples) 
Number of observations: 41851 (0% cost efficiency) and 41771 (2% cost efficiency). 
Our economies are sufficiently differentiated in terms of share of the outside option 
(from 0.0% to 99.7%), aggregate demand elasticity (from -15.886 to -0.0001) and observed 
market shares of merging firms (from 0.1% to 93.6% for the first merging firm, and similar 
for the second one). Extreme values of all variables ar  found to lie in reasonable ranges while 
mean values are not unrealistic. 
In the sample with no cost efficiencies post-merger price changes of the first firm vary 
from -0.42% to 285%, and similar for the second one. W  also observe sometimes negative 
changes in prices of non-merging firms, although these changes are very small with respect to 
their merging rivals. Merger can indeed cause price decreases in some economic settings both 
for merging and non-merging firms. All those cases are kept in the sample and make a part of 
the analysis. 
Parameters Mean Variance Min Max 
Own price demand elasticity, 1st firm -6.925 4.041 -30.167 -1.794 
Own price demand elasticity, 2nd firm -6.919 4.030 -30.256 -1.811 
Cross price demand elasticity , 12ε  0.512 0.669 0.003 6.993 
Cross price demand elasticity, 21ε  0.509 0.665 0.002 6.891 
Aggregate demand elasticity -2.170 1.770 -15.866 -0.0001 
Market share of the outside option,0
s
 0.686 0.227 0.000 0.997 
Market share of the 1stfirm  (true) 0.034 0.039 0.00 2 0.354 
Market share of the 2nd firm  (true) 0.034 0.040 0.00 2 0.433 
Market share of the 1stfirm  (observed) 0.109 0.107 0.001 0.936 
Market share of the 2nd firm  (observed) 0.110 0.108 0.001 0.939 
Sum of observed market shares )( 21 ss +  0.219 0.142 0.002 .096 
Price change of the 1st firm, % (0% efficiency) 1.914 4.025 -0.427 285.057 
Price change of the 2nd firm, % (0% efficiency) 1.892 3.983 -0.003 255.239 
Price change of the 1st firm, % (2% efficiency) 0.413 4.039 -2.778 282.669 
Price change of the 2nd firm, % (2% efficiency) 0.393 4.012 -3.860 252.231 
Post-merger HHI 2403.9 978.5 1257.4 9135.2 
 213.5 296.0 0.0 4377.3 ∆HHI
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Appendix E - Approximation of the post merger price change 
Consider an industry where J single product firms produce substitutes and compete in 
prices to maximize their own profits Jjpdpdcpp jjjjj ,1),())](([)( =⋅−=π , where )( pd j



















))(( pdc jj  is a per-unit cost function and )...,( 21 Jpppp = is the price vector. No other 
specific restrictions are imposed on demand or costfunctions, except that both are (at least 
twice) differentiable. Then suppose that, without loss of generality, firms 1 and 2 merge. As it 
was established in the main part of the paper, a horizontal merger in terms of price effects is 
equivalent to an introduction of certain per-unit ‘merger taxes’. Those taxes, that can be seen 
as simple cost shocks, are introduced simultaneously only for merging entities and are firm-
specific, so that )0,...,0,,( 21
mmm tt= , where ‘t’ stands for ‘tax’ and ‘m’ stands for ‘merg r’. 
The pre-merger system of first order conditions JjpF j ,1),( = is, therefore, described 



































∂π  (E1) 
When any arbitrary vector of per-unit firm-specific taxes ),...,( 2,1 Jtttt = is introduced 
into the profit function, it would result in a new system of first order conditions, that we 
denote as JjtpF j ,1),,(ˆ = . As demonstrated in Jaffe and Weyl (2011), the firms’ price 
reactions on these taxes can be derived through a full differentiation of the system of first 
order conditions JjtpF j ,1),,(ˆ =  around the pre-tax equilibrium (prices
*p  and taxes














∂≈       (E2) 
By setting the full derivative in (E2) equal to zero and assuming that the matrixes of 
partial derivatives with respect to p and t are non-singular, one can obtain the following 
system of equations that defines the sought-for price reactions: 
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=  is by definition a pre-tax (pre-merger) pass-
through matrix. For simplicity of representation here and further explanatory variables will be 
omitted. Now recall that in the initial (pre-tax orp e-merger) equilibrium there are no taxes, 
i.e. )0,...,0(* =t , and hence tdt = . Applying this result to a merger case, i.e assuming that 








        (E4) 
Given that merger taxes are only applicable to merging parties, i.e. )0..,0,,( 21
mmm ttt = , 
system of equations in (E4) can be simplified to: 
mm tmtmdp 2121111 +=          (E5) 
mm tmtmdp 1212222 +=          (E6) 
Jitmtmdp mi
m
ii ,3,2211 =+=         (E7) 
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Appendix F - Properties of the pass-through matrix 
Consider a pre-merger pass-through matrix M , as derived in the Appendix E, that is a 
JJ × matrix, with own pass-through rates Jimii ,1, = on the diagonal, and cross pass-through 
rates in the upper and lower triangular parts.ijm stands for the cross pass-through rate that 
defines the reaction of firm i on the cost shock of firm j.  
First note, that ∆  in (E3) from Appendix E contains first derivatives of the first order 






∂≡Λ ),(),(  from the same equation has positive elements on the 
diagonal and zeros below and above diagonal.  Altogether, it assures that M is positive 
definite. The latter, in turn, has two implications. First, all diagonal elements, i.e. the own 
pass-through rates, are positive. Second, it requirs that Jjimmm jjiiij ,1,),,max(max =≤
that means that cross pass-through cannot dominate own pass-through. 
As it follows from (E3) in Appendix E, calculations of the pass-through matrix involve 
the inversion of the matrix of second order derivatives. For an arbitrary number of firms 
analysis of the elements of the matrix or its determinant is a very challenging task as no 
explicit and easy-to-use formulas exist, even if one assumes symmetry. Alternatively, as 
demonstrated below, some interesting observations ca  be made by observing the plotted 
values of calculated determinants and respective matrix elements.  
When firms are symmetric the pass-through matrix can be always represented as 
MM
~⋅=α , where α  is a positive constant and M~ is a symmetric matrix with ‘1’s on the 
diagonal and mmij
~~ ≡  below and above diagonal. M~ is positive definite, because it is a product 
of a positive constant and a positive definite matrix.  Therefore determinants of all of its 
principal minors should be positive. As I demonstrate below, it imposes some constraints on 
ijm
~  (and correspondingly on ijm ) when number of firms increases. 
With the use of SAS software I calculate the determinants of M
~
 for 2000 different m
~
 
that vary from -1 to +1. On the Graph F-1 below I plot those determinants as a function of m
~
for three different number of firms: J=2, J=5 and J=10. Number of firms is chosen arbitrary 
and only serves to illustrate the point as well as to demonstrate that results remain valid 
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whether the number of firms is odd or even. The chosen range for m
~
 satisfies the positive 
sign condition for the determinant of the second principal minor of M
~
. One can observe a 
quite smooth dependence between the two variables and a consistent pattern of its 
transformation when the number of firms J is changing. 
Tracking the signs of determinants of principal minors for different J serves to verify 
whether the number of firms poses a restriction on m
~
. Recall that M
~
 is positive definite, 
therefore all J precedent principal minors should be positive. On the Graf F-1 below one can 
see that the range of m
~
 that allow for (strictly) positive determinants decr ases with number 
of firms. This effect is stronger for negative m
~
s.  
Graph F-1: Determinant of M
~





In other words, the analysis suggests that cross pa-through rate can only be less 
significant relative to own pass-through when number of competitors is growing, all other 
parameters being fixed. 
Similarly, under symmetry, the matrix ∆  from (E3) in Appendix E can be represented 
as ∆⋅=∆ ~χ , where χ is a positive constant and ∆~  is a matrix with ‘1’ on the diagonal and    
δ~  above and below the diagonal. ∆ is the matrix of first derivatives of the first order 
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conditions, and therefore is negative definite so that he equilibrium second order conditions 
are satisfied. Therefore ∆
~
 is negative definite too. 
On the Gaph F-2 below I plot the δ~ as a function of the corresponding off-diagonal 
element in the inverse matrix1~−∆  for J=2, J=5 and J=10. δ~varies from -1 to +1 to satisfy the 
sign condition of the second principal minor of ∆~ . Original sample contained 2000 
observations, but was treated to keep only those cas where the pre-merger equilibrium 
second order conditions are satisfied (the signs of the determinants of principal minors should 
alternate).  
Graph F-2: Correspondence of non-diagonal elements in ∆~  and 1~−∆  
(symmetric case) 
 
First observation is that δ~  always agrees in sign with the corresponding off-diagonal element 
in 
1~−∆ . As matrix Λ  from (E3) has positive elements on the diagonal and zeros below and 
above diagonal, then off-diagonal elements in M have the same signs as those in 
1~−∆ , and 
therefore the same as in ∆
~




∂=∆ π , therefore, the sign of the cross-pass-




∂ π2 . 
 
